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Abstract
Political interest of citizens usually is depicted as an individual attribute that can be explained by
referring to the resources and skills of the people concerned. The analyses presented here are based
on a critical assessment of the explanatory power of these approaches in cross-national and
longitudinal comparisons. Instead, a contextual model is presented emphasising the relevance of
distinct degrees of politicisation in different societal settings in addition to the traditional socio-
demographic factors (education, age, and gender) at the micro-level. The resulting multi-level model
combines both individual and contextual factors to explain the cross-national differences and changes
in political involvement and apathy in Europe in the last three decades. The politicisation thesis, which
states that the level of political interest among citizens is a positive and monotonous function of the
relevance of societal and political arrangements in a society, is not supported by the empirical findings
presented here. The most noteworthy conclusion is the remarkable disappearance of the impact of
societal politicisation when the level of socio-economic development of each country is included in
multi-level models. The level of political interest, then, depends on the level of socio-economic
development.
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1. Introduction
In virtually each and every treatise of the problems and prospects of democratic decision
making, the degree of political engagement of citizens plays a crucial role. Some level of political
interest among citizens is a necessary condition for the distinction between democratic and
non-democratic government. The debates focus on the degree or distribution of political interest;
not on the decisive role of involvement in this kind of discussions (cf. Almond and Verba 1963:
474ff; Berelson et al. 1954: 307; Barber 1984: 117). Direct attacks on vested interests or severe
social conflicts may be major incentives for political interest. However, even when their vital
interests are not at stake, citizens in democratic political systems are expected to pay some
attention to political phenomena. A kind of curiosity about politics should be characteristic of
citizens in democratic systems regardless of their actual needs or attempts to participate in political
decision-making processes.
In order to avoid confusion with related concepts, political interest must be delimited from
political motivation, involvement, or participation. Political interest is defined here as the ‘degree
to which politics arouses a citizen’s curiosity’ (van Deth 1990: 278); it is the ‘attentiveness to
politics’ (Zaller 1992:18) and the potential readiness to participate. It is not a mode of political
behaviour, but a type of political commitment and involvement only. Usually, the level of political
interest is explained by referring to resources and skills of individual citizens. A number of studies
discloses education, age, and gender as three highly relevant predictors of political interest at the
individual level: a higher level of education comes along with a higher level of political interest, older
people are more interested than young people (but involvement decreases rapidly in the last phase
of life), and men always show more interest in public affairs than women do. Although the strength
of these correlations is frequently rather modest at best, and several other factors are related to
political interest too, these results have been confirmed in many studies in many countries (cf. van
Deth and Elff 2000).
Unquestionably political interest defined in terms of curiosity is an attribute of individual citizens.
Based on this truism virtually each and every study available is restricted to the impact of individual
resources and skills. Typical for these approaches is the dominance of psychological and socio-
psychological theories, and only rarely contextual factors such as the spread of modern mass
media are considered. In addition to these commonly used ‘push theories’ (for instance suggesting
that education instigates political interest), there are hardly any ‘pull theories’ or goal-oriented
theories available that rely on societal and political opportunities and circumstances (for  instance
suggesting that government intervention activates political interest). Since micro-level approaches
only are clearly inadequate to explain cross-national and longitudinal differences in political interest
(van Deth and Elff 2000), contextual factors have to be taken into account. The more relevant
political arrangements are for a society, the higher the level of political interest will be.
Abei tspapiere –Mannheimer  Zentrum für  Europäische Sozia l fo rschung 36
-2-
In this paper we develop a contextual model for political interest emphasising the relevance of
distinct degrees of politicisation in different societal settings in addition to the traditional socio-
cultural factors (education, date of birth or age, and gender) at the micro-level. A multi-level
model is presented  combining both individual and contextual factors to explain the cross-
national differences and changes in political involvement and apathy in Europe in the last few
decades. The concept politicisation refers to the relevance of societal and political
arrangements for a society, and four major factors at the macro-level (cleavages, state
intervention, openness of the political system, and control capacity of government) are
discussed. Beside, a number of indicators at the macro-level are selected to measure the
degree of politicisation in Europe in the last decades.1 Finally, a multi-level model is tested
covering both individual-level factors and indicators for the degree of politicisation. This
integrated approach appears to result in a satisfactory explanation of the persisting cross-
national differences in political interest. The database at the micro-level consists of a
combination of all Eurobarometer surveys available for the period from 1970 to 1998,
compromising a total of more than 900,000 respondents in a number of European countries
(see Appendix).2 The countries included are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany (West), Great Britain, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands Norway, Portugal, Spain,
and Sweden.
2. The Politicisation of Society
A number of studies offer information about the development of political interest in Europe,
many of them suggesting an increasing level of political involvement (cf. Kaase and Marsh
1979: 36; Dalton 1988: 22 and 1996: 26). However, the trend of increasing political interest is
not a universal phenomenon: it increases in several countries, decreases in other, and shows
trendless fluctuations in still other countries (cf. van den Broek and Heunks 1993; Gabriel and
van Deth 1995; Topf 1995; van Deth 1996; Bennett 1984: 552; van Deth 1990: 282; Miller and
Shanks 1996: 107-11). Yet it is also clear that the absolute levels of political interest are still
rather low, and analyses of trends show that on average only one out of every six European
citizens frequently discusses politics with his or her friends, while every third citizen never
touches upon this topic (cf. Inglehart 1990: 353-4; Topf 1995: 61; van Deth 1991: 204 and
                                                     
1 The extensive data set of macro-indicators for the politicisation of European societies is especially
developed for the project ‘Political Interest, Involvement, and Affect’ (PIEB) financed by the German
National Science Foundation DFG (Grant 630/2-1). This generous support is gratefully acknowledged
here.
2 The data set includes the European Community Study 1973, as well as every Eurobarometer survey in
the period mentioned (Eurobarometer 3 through 49.0). Just as the data set mentioned in the previous
note, this data set is especially developed for the project ‘Political Interest, Involvement, and Affect’
(PIEB) financed by the German National Science Foundation DFG (Grant 630/2-1). See van Deth and
Elff (2000) for further details of the data set of micro-indicators.
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1996a: 386-7; van Deth and Elff 2000). Behind each and every summary of this kind of
aggregated figures huge cross-national differences can be observed (van Deth 1996a: 387; van
Deth and Elff 2000).
Since micro-level explanations only are not adequate to explain the persistent cross-national
differences in the levels of political interest in Europe, the introduction of contextual factors
should be considered. A relatively high level of political interest of an individual citizen can be
the consequence of the apparent relevance of societal and political arrangements, while
deficient performance or invisibility of these arrangements instigate less interest in politics or
even political apathy (cf. Rosenberg 1954). In general terms, the politicisation thesis states that
the level of political interest among citizens is a positive and monotonous function of the
relevance of societal and political arrangements in a society (van Deth 1991). The persistent
cross-national differences in political interest and the seemingly inconsistent trends in several
countries, then, can be seen as the result of different levels of politicisation between these
societies.
Several interpretations of varying degrees of politicisation in Europe are available. First of all,
the relevance of societal and political arrangements is closely related to the development of
several cleavages in the last few centuries. The origins of many of these cleavages go back to
the combined impact of the rise of the nation-state and the industrial revolution. Cleavages are
those deep-rooted divisions within a society that have structured political conflict and
competition. According to the seminal work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 14) in this area, four
main cleavages can be discerned in Europe: a denominational cleavage, a centre-periphery
cleavage, an urban-rural cleavage, and an owner-worker cleavage. Despite the apparent
‘defreezing’ of these potential conflict lines since the 1960s, many societal and political
arrangements are still based on these contrary positions. Cleavages establish a first
interpretation of the politicisation thesis: the level of political interest is a positive and
monotonous function of the relevance of those deep-rooted divisions within society.
In addition to direct references to long-term cleavages, political interest can be induced if people
are confronted with severe societal problems and the way government handles these issues. In
many countries, ongoing and increasing intervention of political decision makers in the economic
process (especially dealing with aspects of macro-economic policies like inflation, employment,
budgetary deficits, and the like) can be observed. Besides, state intervention increases with
economic growth. As per capita real income increases, governments will spend a higher proportion
of national product than before (‘Wagner’s Law’) , and the number of distinct activities covered by
government regulation, subsidising, or taxation increases as well. With each rise in government
spending and with each expansion of government tasks the number of interests grows. The avera-
ge citizen, then, is confronted with an ever-growing invasion of government intervention in many
areas, and a continuing ‘fiscalisation’ of the problems he or she faces. As a consequence, the
number of people exposed to political stimuli increases while, furthermore, the significance of
Abei tspapiere –Mannheimer  Zentrum für  Europäische Sozia l fo rschung 36
-4-
political conflicts becomes more evident for more people. From this line of reasoning a second
interpretation of the politicisation thesis follows: the level of political interest among the populace
also is a positive and monotonous function of the relevance of the role of government in society.
Three aspects of this role can be distinguished: the degree of state intervention, openness of the
political system, and the control capacity of the state.
The degree of state intervention refers to the significance of the state as a central agency for
distributing resources and of benefits. Beside, modern states function as a major employer for
substantive parts of the workforce. Political participation and political interest are directed
towards decisions about the course of action of the state and towards processes and
procedures leading to those decisions. Thus, state intervention should be a major incentive for
political interest of individual citizens. A political system with a low degree of state intervention
offers a relatively weak stimulus for citizens to show political interest (and vice versa). A certain
degree of state intervention is a necessary condition for government actions to have
consequences for the daily life of citizens.
With political system openness as a dimension of the relevance of the role of government we
refer to the extend to which the polity offers opportunities for political participation.3 Just as was
the case with the previous aspects of politicisation, the significance of this attribute can be
justified in a straightforward and rather trivial manner. Political participation – at least legitimate
modes of participation –  presupposes appropriate opportunities. If no potentially effective ways
to influence politics are available for individual citizens, there is hardly any reason for being
curious about political phenomena. In a similar way it can be expected that by offering a wide
variety of easy ‘entrances’, the political system lures political interest. In general: the higher the
degree of openness of a political system, the higher the level of political interest will be.
State intervention and openness of the political system are necessary conditions for political
participation to have some effect on decision-making processes. In addition, the control capacity
of government is considered to be a distinct aspect of politicisation here. With this concept we
refer to the chance that the state can reach its policy goals effectively, either in the sense of
protecting the status quo or by accomplishing social change. A high degree of state intervention
does not necessarily imply that government has a high degree of control over society or over
actions of agents of the state itself. State interventions create commitments for the state that
cannot easily be dissolved and they may also create vested interests for groups benefiting from
certain policies. Not only is there a conceptual difference between state intervention and control
capacity, there are also good reasons to expect that the control capacity is relevant for the level
of political interest in a society. State intervention just motivates political interest and political
                                                     
3 This conceptualization makes clear that we rely heavily on the work of authors dealing with the concept
‘political opportunity structure’ (see Eisinger 1973; Tarrow 1983; Kitschelt 1986; or Kriesi et al. 1995).
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participation, because there is something at stake for citizens.  Control capacity, on the other
hand, guarantees that citizens indeed can get what they want and institutionalises relationships
between state and society.
The two major categories (cleavages and role of the state), and the three specifications of this
last group (intervention, openness, and control capacity) are used here as aspects of the
degree of politicisation of society. They establish the ‘pull factors’ for the level of political interest
and apathy of individual citizens that can be expected to contribute to the explanation of the
persistent differences in political interest at the cross-national level. However, these factors
should be considered as extensions of the conventional individual-level approaches; that is, an
adequate model to test the available interpretations is to develop a multi-level model covering
both micro- and macro-interpretations. In such a model, attention should also be paid to the
possible impacts of rapid societal, economical, and political changes broadly indicated by the
term modernisation. Modernisation theories view the process of socio-economic development
as the prime source of societal and political change. This process comprises broad changes in
the society with respect to economic productivity, changes in the division of labour, increasing
urbanisation and mobilisation, and rising levels of education in a country. 4 In this perspective
the persistent cross-national differences in the level of political interest in Europe can be the
result of different levels of modernisation reached by respective nations. The multi-level model
designed here, then, has to take general aspects of modernisation into account. Before we turn
to that model the principal factors mentioned have to be operationalised first.
3. Operationalisations
For an empirical test of the politicisation thesis data covering both political interest at the
individual level and the major aspects of the politicisation of society are required. The
operationalisation of these factors is briefly depicted in the current section; a detailed
description is presented in the Appendix at the end of this research note.
3.1 Political Involvement and Apathy
Attempts to measure psychological concepts like the degree to which politics arouses a citizen’s
curiosity directly present many complications related to the distinction between interest and
behavioural utterances or consequences of interest (van Deth 1989). A direct question on the
frequency of political discussion is used here as an indicator of the direct expression of political
interest. The responses ‘talking about politics frequently’ or ‘occasionally’ are not easy to
                                                     
4 See for a brief discussion of this concept and an overview of the relevant literature Riegel (1995) and
especially the critical discussion by Berger (1996).
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distinguish and the only unambiguous response is ‘never’ engaging in political discussions.
Consequently, the concept political apathy can be defined in an clear-cut way. Respondents
providing this answer show an evident lack of political interest and this response – and only this
response – is considered to be an indicator of political apathy (van Deth 1991: 206; van Deth
and Elff 2000). Especially the response that the respondent discusses politics ‘frequently’
suggests a clear level of political interest. Therefore, this  response – and only this response –
is considered to be an indicator of political involvement here (Gabriel and van Deth 1995: 396).
3.2 Politicisation
In the previous section, various aspects of the concept politicisation are distinguished: cleavage
structure, state intervention, openness of the political system, and control capacity of the state.
With one exception, all these dimensions of politicisation can be further decomposed in sub-
dimensions, which are then operationalised by measures from various sources. In order to test
the internal coherence among items used for indices for these sub-dimensions principle-
Figure 1: Operationalisation of the Concept Politicisation
PoliticisationGeneral concept:
State 
intervention
Political system 
openness
Control capacity 
of the state
Dimensions of 
the concept:
Opportunity 
structure
Sub-
dimensions:
Original 
measures 
from various 
sources
Cleavages
⋅⋅⋅
State-
church 
cleavage
⋅⋅⋅
⋅⋅⋅
Fragmen-
tation
Balance
State 
intervention
First 
rotated 
dimension ⋅⋅⋅
⋅⋅⋅ ⋅⋅⋅
Second 
rotated 
dimension
Constructed
measures
⋅⋅⋅ ⋅⋅⋅
⋅⋅⋅
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components analyses are carried out. Figure 1 provides an overview of this procedure.
3.2.1 Cleavages
Cleavages are those deep-rooted divisions within society that have structured political conflict
and competition. The work of Rae and Taylor (1970) offers an interpretation of cleavages in
terms of measurable features of a society, creating a concept out of a metaphor. Three
attributes are of special interest when considering cleavages as an aspect politicisation: (i) the
fragmentation of a society by a cleavage, (ii) the crystallisation of a cleavage in a society, and
(iii) the intensity of the cleavage (in terms of political conflict). In addition, the balance of a
cleavage, that is, the advantage that one of the groups involved has compared to other groups
in terms of mass support can be measured.
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) mention four main lines of cleavage that emerge during the transition
of West European polities into modernity. These lines of cleavage are the state-church
cleavage, the center-periphery cleavage, the urban-rural cleavage, and the owner-worker
cleavage. As far as possible and substantially meaningful, for each of these cleavages indices
are developed to measure fragmentation, crystallisation, intensity, and balance. Thus,
denominational fragmentation is the most appropriate measure of the state-church cleavage,
while the proportion of Catholics, Protestants, and people without creed can be seen as
alternative measures for the balance of this cleavage. Church attendance figures as an indicator
for the crystallisation in this case. For the centre-periphery cleavage only measures for
fragmentation and balance are available: ethnic fragmentation and the proportion of the ethnic
majority of the population of a country. For the urban-rural cleavage the relative size of the
agricultural sector is the only appropriate measure available. For the owner-worker cleavage we
can only employ strike activity as a measure of intensity.
3.2.2 State Intervention
The concept state intervention refers to the role and position of governmental intervention.
Three major aspects can be discerned: the degree to which governmental institutions extract
resources from general society, the degree to which they provide benefits and services, and the
proportion of the workforce employed by governmental institutions and state-owned firms. From
a principle-components analysis, it follows that the indicators selected all fit in a one-
dimensional latent structure. Therefore, a single index of state intervention is constructed based
on the factor scores obtained from this principle-components analysis.
3.2.3 Political System Openness
Openness of a political system denotes the propensity of a political system to allow for the
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expression of political demands, to be responsive to these demands, and to give opportunities
for citizens’ participation. Freedom of expressing political opinions is generally regarded as a
basic feature of democratic polity, so only little variation is to be expected among democratic
countries in this respect. The existence of institutional channels of participation however may
vary according to the emphasis that the respective countries’ constitutions give to political
representation or to more direct forms of participation like referenda. Besides, when it comes to
the politicisation aspects of a polity, the historical experience with respect to political openness
may also be relevant. Responsiveness of a polity to citizens’ demands, however, is an aspect of
openness of the political system that is difficult, if not impossible, to measure. A measurement
of responsiveness would presuppose knowledge of citizens’ demands in general and of the way
government’s policies reflect these demands.
Three types of indicators of openness of the political system are used in the subsequent
analyses: indicators based on general democracy indices, indicators based on measures for the
institutional opportunity structure for mass participation in politics, and indicators based on
measures for the historical record of democracy in European countries.
Although principle-components analysis does not support – at least for European countries –
the notion of a single dimension underlying the various indices of democracy, we prefer the use
of a single summary measure based on factor scores that taps the common features of these
indices rather than the idiosyncrasies of their original construction by several authors. For the
institutional opportunity structure, however, we employ two measures, since two clearly
interpretable dimensions result from principle-components analysis: opportunities for
participation via referenda and opportunities for influencing the composition of legislative
bodies. The historical record of democracy also seems to exhibit a two-dimensional structure: a
dimension relating to authoritarian interruptions of democracy and a dimension referring to the
original transition to democracy. The former of these dimensions, however, seems to be more
coherent than the latter. Therefore, we also employ two measures for this sub-dimension of the
concept of openness of the political system.
3.2.4 Control Capacity of the State
Control capacity of government refers to the properties of a political system that determine the
attainment of political goals set by governments. That is, we do not refer to the administrative
skills and political determinateness of politicians acting as members of government but rather to
the structural properties of a political system that restrict or facilitate their political pursuits. We
measure the control capacity of a government by those properties of the political system that
are relatively easy to observe: centralisation of governmental structures, the institutional
constraints to (central) government, stability and effectiveness of national governments, and
structures of interest mediation.
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For centralisation of governmental structures and for structures of interest mediation
respectively, the notion of a single dimension is supported by principle-components analyses.
Therefore we use in our subsequent analyses for each centralisation and for interest mediation
a single measure based on factor scores. Structures of government stability and effectiveness,
however, seem to have two dimensions: a dimension that relates to government stability and a
dimension that relates to government effectiveness. Thus two measures are used in this case.
3.2.5 Modernisation
In order to test the assumption that levels of political interest are less related to specific features
of the political system than to the general state of socio-economic modernisation, an index of
modernisation is constructed based on measures of economic productivity and the sectoral
composition of the workforce. The results of the principle-components analysis clearly support a
one-dimensional model of socio-economic modernisation.
4. A Multi-level Model of Political Involvement and Political
Apathy
Considerable variation in the level of political involvement and political apathy both between
countries and over time can be shown in Europe in the last decades (van Deth and Elff 2000).
This variation is difficult to describe in a simple way. Are cross-national differences relatively
stable or are these differences overwhelmed by intra-national fluctuations? Are temporal
variations nation-specific or do they occur in all countries simultaneously? These questions
have to be answered before we turn to the more substantive study of contextual effects of
politicisation on political involvement and political interest. Before explaining variations we need
a basic multi-level model of political involvement and political apathy that makes clear what is to
be explained.
4.1 The Method: Multi-level Logistic Regression
Multi-level modelling (Goldstein 1995; Snijders and Bosker 1999) is a method explicitly
designed to deal with clustered data. The two main reasons to use this method are, first, to
obtain correct coefficient estimates, standard errors, and test statistics, and, second, to model
explicitly the degree of heterogeneity across clusters. Basically, our cross-national and
longitudinal data can be regarded as clustered on the basis of nation and point in time. In
general, a multi-level model should allow for at least three overlapping levels – individuals,
nations, and time points – for each of the two dichotomous dependent variables. These
requirements present challenge that cannot be met by conventional data analysis techniques.
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Ordinary linear regression, logistic regression, Poisson regression models and other
generalised linear models (see Mccullagh and Nelder 1989; Long 1997; Gill 1999) all assume
that residuals are identically independently distributed. The validity of model-related tests – like
likelihood-ratio tests, F-tests, Wald- and Lagrange-Multiplier tests – hinges on this assumption.
In the case of clustered data this assumption is violated. Residuals of observations belonging to
the same cluster are not independent but correlated. This correlation is due to the fact that there
are some common contextual influences specific to each cluster.5 In multi-level models these
common contextual influences are represented by random effects (Snijders and Bosker 1999:
43), which are considered as unobserved variables that have a zero expectation over all
clusters.
The main reason for using multi-level models in our study is the possibility of a decomposition of
unexplained variance of a model into a component at the level of individual observations and a
component at the level of unobserved contextual effects.6 This is made possible by the
assumption that random effects have a certain probability distribution (usually the normal
distribution). In general the means of random effects are assumed to be zero, whereas the
variances of random effects are assumed to be parameters to be estimated from the data,
which are called variance parameters.
Consider a linear two-level model with independent variables x1,..., xp, which has the following
formulation (cf. Goldstein 1995: 17f; Snijders and Bosker 1999: 38ff):
yij=β0+β1x1+...+ βpxp + uj+ eij
where j is the index for clusters and i is the index for an individual observation within cluster j, uj
refers to the random effect corresponding to cluster  j, and eij refers to the residual for
observation i within cluster j. In such a model the unexplained variance of the dependent
variable can be decomposed as follows (Goldstein 1995: 18; Snijders and Bosker 1999: 48):
var(yij|β0,…,βp,x1,...,xp)=var(eij) + var(uj),
where var(y|β0,…,βp,x1,..., xp) denotes the variance unexplained by the independent variables
x1,..., xp, var(eij) denotes the variance of the residuals eij at the level of the individual
                                                     
5 If we had complete information on these contextual influences and if they are included in the model,
this correlation would disappear, of course.
6 An alternative method for obtaining correct tests is to use conventional procedures of estimation and to
construct robust standard errors (see Huber 1967; White 1982; Binder 1983). However it does not
provide for a decomposition of unexplained variance.
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observations, and var(uj) denotes the variance of the random effects uj.7
Another distinctive feature multi-level models is that it allows for complex structures of
contextual effects: Clusters can be nested at several levels or they can be crossed. Clusters at
a lower level are nested into clusters at an upper level if members of a cluster at the lower level
are considered as members of one and only one cluster at the upper level. Observations are
assumed to be more heterogeneous across clusters at the upper level than across clusters at
the lower level. Clusters are crossed if observations belong to clusters in two ways
simultaneously at the same level, but these clusters are not nested (Goldstein 1995: 113ff;
Snijders and Bosker 1999: 155ff). Each of these cases corresponds to a specific structure
among the random effects. For example, a hierarchical three-level model with independent
variables x1,..., xp  is formulated as:
yijk=β0 +β1x1 +...+ βpxp + uk + vjk + eijk,
where j refers to the j-th level-2 cluster within level-3 cluster k and i to the i-th individual
observation within the j-th level-2 cluster within the k-th level-3 cluster, uk refers to the value of
the random effect corresponding to level-3 cluster k, vjk refers to the value of the random effect
corresponding to level-2 cluster j within level-3 cluster k, and eijk refers to the residual for
observation i within cluster j. A crossed random effects model with the same independent
variables and the same number of variance parameters is formulated as:
yijk=β0+β1x1+...+ βpxp +  uj + vk +eijk,
where j refers to the j-th cluster of one way of clustering and k refers to the k-th cluster of the
other way of clustering, while ijk refers to the i-th individual observation within the j-th and k-th
cluster, and uj and vk to the respective random effects. Whether clusters are nested or not, in a
linear-normal three-level model the unexplained variance of the dependent variable can be
decomposed as:
var(yijk|β0,…,βp, x1,..., xp)=var(eijk) + var(uj) + var(vk).
where var(yijk|β0,…,βp,x1,..., xp) denotes the variance unexplained by the independent variables
x1,..., xp, var(eijk) denotes the variance of the residuals eij at the level of the individual
observations, var(uj) denotes the variance of the random effects uj, and var(vk) denotes the
variance of the random effects vk.
The elegant way to decompose of the unexplained variance presented in the previous
                                                     
7 It should be noted that this applies only to the more simple case of a random intercept model without
cross-level interactions and random slopes. If cross-level interactions or random slopes are present in
the model, the decomposition of the variance is more complex (see Goldstein 1995: 20).
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paragraphs is possible only for linear multi-level models. The dependent variables in our study –
political involvement and political apathy – are binary, for which a such a straightforward
decomposition of unexplained variance is not possible.8 However, if one adopts the
interpretation of logistic regression as a linear regression of a continuous latent variable that is
observed in dichotomised form (see e.g. Long 1997: 40ff), this problem has a solution: Instead
of the variance of the binary observed value, the variance of the latent continuous variable is
decomposed. Thus, variance parameters in multi-level logistic regression model can be
interpreted as components of variance of a latent dependent variable (Snijders and Bosker
1999: 223). In the hierarchical three-level case a multi-level logistic regression model has the
form
logit(P(yijk=1)) =β0+β1x1+...+ βpxp + vk + ujk
where P() denotes the probability of the event enclosed in parentheses. Its interpretation as a
threshold model is as follows: Let yijk denote the value of the observed dichotomous dependent
variable and y*ijk the value of the latent continuous dependent variable for individual observation
i within level-2 cluster j within level-3 cluster k, then the relation between the dependent
variable, the independent variables, and the random effects is as follows (Snijders and Bosker
1999: 223):
y*ijk=β0 +β1x1 +...+ βpxp + vk + ujk + eijk ,
P(yijk = 1) = P(y*ijk > 0),
where P() denotes the probability of the event denoted in parentheses. The threshold
interpretation implies that the individual level residuals eijk have a standard logistic distribution
with a fixed variance of π2/3 ≈ 3.289. As a consequence, the inclusion of additional predictors
into the model will affect the estimates of all coefficients and variance parameters (Snijders and
Bosker 1999: 227). Therefore, a better measure for the comparison of unexplained variance at
contextual levels is the residual intra-class correlation coefficient (Snijders and Bosker 1999:
224; Goldstein, Browne and Rasbash 2001: 7) which is the proportion of unexplained variance
that is attributed to a specific contextual level.9 In the case of a logistic three-level model the
residual intra-class coefficient at the up-most level has the form:
ρ = var(vk)/(var(ujk) + var(vk) + π2/3).
Having summarized those features of multi-level analysis relevant of our purpose we can now
                                                     
8 In addition there are a couple of more technical problems (see Snijders and Bosker 1999: 218f). For
recent advances in this field see the excellent overview of Agresti, Booth et al. (2000).
9 This measure also expresses the degree to which residuals are correlated within clusters of a specific
contextual level. Thus intra-cluster or intra-unit correlation would be a more appropriate name.
However, we use the name that is common in the literature.
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turn to the actual construction of multi-level models of political involvement and political apathy.
4.2 Models for Political Involvement and Political Apathy
Since 1973 Eurobarometer studies are conducted in regular half-year intervals, with additional
studies in some of the half-years in the 1990s (see van Deth and Elff 2000: 46f). That is, each
number of an Eurobarometer study reflects a different point in time in the period from 1973 to
1998. In that way we have two independent types of contextual influences on the level of
political involvement and political apathy of individual citizens: (i) the societal context as
indicated by country, and (ii) the temporal context as indicated by the number of the
Eurobarometer study. Each country sub-sample in every Eurobarometer study thus is a cell in a
two-dimensional array with Eurobarometer studies and countries as dimensions. On the basis of
this structure, there are five ways in which multi-level models of political apathy and political
involvement can be formulated: Two two-level models that take either country or Eurobarometer
study as the only way of clustering into consideration, two three-level models, in which either
countries are nested into Eurobarometer studies or Eurobarometer studies are nested into
countries, and a model in which countries and Eurobarometer studies constitute crossed
random-effects.
To control for individual-level impacts and compositional effects, all multi-level models contain
the level of education, gender, and birth cohort membership of the respondents as predictors.
Education is measured by the age at which respondents finished full-time education and is
reduced to a trichotomy with the categories ‘up to 15 years’, ‘16 to 19 years’, and ‘20 year or
older’. People still studying were assigned to these categories according to their actual age.
Gender is, of course, a single dichotomy. Based on the years of birth of respondents a cohort
scheme is constructed with five categories. This cohort scheme is derived from van den Broek
(1996) and comprises the categories ‘pre-war generation’ (born until 1930), ‘silent generation’
(born from 1931 to 1940), ‘protest generation’ (born from 1941 to 1955), ‘lost generation’ (born
from 1956 to 1970), and ‘pragmatic generation’ (born after 1970). 10
Consider the two-level model for political apathy or political involvement first, which is based on
countries as the only clustering units. This model can be formulated as follows:
logit(pi,(country)) = β0 + β1⋅EDUC1 + β1⋅EDUC3 + β1⋅GENDER + β1⋅PREWAR + β1⋅SILENT + β1⋅LOST +
β1⋅PRAGMATIC + u(country)
where pi,(country) denotes the probability that the i-th individual in a country is classified as
                                                     
10 See van Deth and Elff (2000: 7ff) for an extensive discussion of these factors and their
operationalisation.
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politically involved or politically apathetic, EDUC1, EDUC3, GENDER, PRE-WAR, SILENT, LOST, and
PRAGMATIC denote the dummy variables for education, gender, and birth cohort, while u(country)
denotes the random effects of the individual countries.11
Analogously, the two-level model that considers only Eurobarometer studies as clustering units
has the form:
logit(pi,(eb)) = β0 + β1⋅EDUC1 + β1⋅EDUC3 + β1⋅GENDER + β1⋅PREWAR + β1⋅SILENT + β1⋅LOST +
β1⋅PRAGMATIC + u(eb)
In this case, pi,(eb) denotes the probability the i-th individual in the Eurobarometer study denoted
by the number eb is classified as politically involved or politically apathetic, and u(eb) denotes the
random effect of this Eurobarometer study. These models involve only one variance parameter
each, the variance of u(country) and u(eb), which are denoted by σ(country) and σ(eb), respectively.
Estimates of these variance parameters are the prime interest in the following analyses, since
they express the degree of variation in the level of political apathy or political involvement
between countries and between time points, respectively. The first of these two-level models
implies that individuals from the same country are more similar with respect to political
involvement or political apathy than individuals from different countries, taken into account the
effects of the three individual-level predictors. The second of these models implies that
individuals interviewed in the same Eurobarometer study are more similar with respect to
political involvement or political apathy than individuals interviewed in different Eurobarometer
studies, taken into account the effects of the variables mentioned.
The corresponding three-level models differ from the two-level models mainly in that an
additional random-effect and an additional variance parameter is involved. Thus, the model for
political involvement or political apathy in which countries are assumed to be nested within
Eurobarometer studies has the form:
logit(pi,(country,eb)) = β0 + β1⋅EDUC1 + β1⋅EDUC3 + β1⋅GENDER + β1⋅PREWAR + β1⋅SILENT + β1⋅LOST +
β1⋅PRAGMATIC + u(country,eb) + v(eb)
while the model for political involvement or political apathy in which Eurobarometer studies are
assumed to be nested within countries is formulated as:
logit(pi,(eb,country)) = β0 + β1⋅EDUC1 + β1⋅EDUC3 + β1⋅GENDER + β1⋅PREWAR + β1⋅SILENT + β1⋅LOST +
β1⋅PRAGMATIC + u(eb,country) + v(country)
                                                     
11 Dummy variables for education, gender, and birth cohort are effect-coded, with ‘16 to 19 years’, ‘male’,
and ‘protest generation’ as reference categories.
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In these formulas, pi,(country,eb) denotes the probability that the i-th individual in country country
that is nested in Eurobarometer study eb is classified as politically involved or politically
apathetic, while pi,(eb,country) denotes the propability that the i-th individual nested into
Eurobarometer study eb in country country is classified as politically involved or politically
apathetic. The random effect of country country that is nested into Eurobarometer study eb is
denoted by u(country,eb), while u(eb,country) denotes the random effect of Eurobarometer study eb
nested into country country. V(eb) denotes the random effect of the Eurobarometer study eb,
V(country) denotes the random effect of country country. The first of these three-level models
assumes that – after controlling for the effects of education, gender, and birth cohort – there are
always similarities between individuals interviewed in the same Eurobarometer study with
respect to political involvement and political apathy, respectively. Similarities between
individuals from the same country exist only if they are interviewed in the same Eurobarometer
study. The second model assumes that, after controlling for the effects of education, gender,
and birth cohort, individuals from the same country are always similar, while individuals
interviewed in the same Eurobarometer study are only similar if they also belong to the same
country.
The crossed random-effects models are based on the assumption that neither countries are
nested into Eurobarometer studies nor Eurobarometer studies are nested into countries. An
individual from a certain country shares the same random effect with any individual from the
same country and, simultaneously, shares the same random effect with any individual in the
same Eurobarometer study, regardless from which country he or she comes. That is, the
crossed random-effects model implies that – taking into account the effect of the individual-level
variables – temporal variations in the levels of political apathy or political involvement occur in
all countries simultaneously. The crossed random-effects models for political involvement and
political apathy are formulated as follows:
logit(pi,(eb,country)) = β0 + β1⋅EDUC1 + β1⋅EDUC3 + β1⋅GENDER + β1⋅PREWAR + β1⋅SILENT + β1⋅LOST +
β1⋅PRAGMATIC + u(eb) + v(country)
4.3 Results
In the preceding sections multi-level analysis and the models used to examine the structure of
political involvement or political apathy are introduced. We now turn to the discussion of the
actual estimation results of the previously developed five models, starting with the models for
political involvement. Table 1 shows estimates for the five multi-level models for political
involvement. There are some differences between estimates for the five models of the fixed
effects, that is between the estimates of the coefficients of individual-level variables and the
constant term, which may reflect the fact that the data are not balanced with respect to their
clustering into countries (for some countries, data are available only since the mid-1980s).
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Yet, these differences are rather modest. The estimates of the variance parameters in all
models show clearly that the largest part of unexplained variance of political involvement and
political apathy is located at the individual level. At the contextual level, there is more variation
in the level of political involvement between countries than between Eurobarometer studies,
irrespective whether Eurobarometer studies are modelled as being nested into countries or as
crossed over countries. The variance parameter for country in the country-only two-level model
is five times larger than the variance parameter for Eurobarometer studies in the two-level
model that considers only Eurobarometer studies as units of clustering. This result is not due to
mere sampling error, since the estimate of the variance parameter for countries is also more
than two times larger than its standard error.
Table 1: Basic Multi-Level Models for Political Involvement
Two-level models Three-level models Crossed-
effects model
Individuals
within
countries
Individuals
within
studies
Individuals
within
countries,
countries within
studies
Individuals
within studies,
studies within
countries
Individuals
within
countries and
studies
Coefficients at
individual level
Up to 15
years
-.486
(.006)
-.505
(.006)
-.494
(.006)
-.504
(.008)
-.491
(.006)
Age when
finished
full time
education *
20 years
and more
.533
(.005)
.548
(.005)
.544
(.005)
.544
(.007)
.542
(.005)
Gender ** -.276
(.004)
-.274
(.004)
-.278
(.004)
-.278
(.004)
-.267
(.005)
Prewar .205
(.007)
.194
(.007)
.189
(.008)
.212
(.010)
.190
(.008)
Silent .287
(.008)
.286
(.008)
.283
(.008)
.293
(.011)
.283
(.008)
Lost -.207
(.007)
-.196
(.007)
-.192
(.007)
-.188
(.010)
-.194
(.007)
Birth
cohort ***
Pragmatic -.507
(.013)
-.509
(.013)
-.495
(.013)
-.547
(.016)
-.494
(.013)
Constant -1.869
(.078)
-1.821
(.017)
-1.872
(.017)
-1.887
(.080)
-1.819
(.006)
Variance parameters
Individuals 3.289 3.289 3.289 3.289 3.289
Eurobarometer studies - .016
(.003)
.005†
(.003)
.038
(.003)
.000†
(.000)
Countries .084
(.032)
- .116
(.007)
.087
(.034)
.166
(.004)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Effect coded with 16 to 19 years as baseline category; ** effect
coded with male as baseline category; *** effect coded with protest as baseline category; † not
statistically significant; all other estimates are statistically significant at a 1% level.
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These results obtained for two-level models are further supported by the three-level and
crossed-effects models. In all cases the variance parameter for countries is larger than the
variance parameter for Eurobarometer studies. In the three-level model assuming that countries
are nested into Eurobarometer studies, the variance parameter for countries is estimated as
over 20 times higher than the variance parameter for Eurobarometer studies. In the crossed-
effects model, the variance parameter of countries gets an even larger estimate, while the
variance parameter for studies is estimated as zero. The remarkable result obtained for the
crossed-effects model (zero variance for the impact of the studies), however, might be caused
by a problem of the estimation procedure.12
Table 2 shows the estimates for the five models discussed in the previous subsection for
political apathy. As far as two-level and three-level models are concerned, we obtain the same,
but even more pronounced results than for political involvement. The variance parameter for
country is at least 20 times higher than the variance parameter for Eurobarometer studies, both
in the two-level models and in the crossed-effects model.
In our three-level models for political involvement and for political apathy – the model in which
countries are nested into Eurobarometer studies and the model in which Eurobarometer studies
are nested into countries – the variance parameter of the country random-effects are almost
identical. However, in the model where countries are considered as nested into Eurobarometer
studies the variance parameter for Eurobarometer studies is estimated as zero, while in the
other three-level model the variance parameter is small (but much larger than the corresponding
standard error). What do these results tell us? The problem with comparing the models for
political involvement and political apathy is that goodness-of-fit statistics hardly tell us anything
about which structure of random effects is the correct one. The only way to decide which model
should be the base for further analyses is to compare the estimates for the variance parameters
directly.
                                                     
12 The software MLwiN (Rasbash, Browne et al. 1998) used in these analyses is optimised for the
estimation multi-level models with nested random effects. If random effects are nested, then the large
matrices that have to be inverted during the estimation process have a typical structure, which allows
for a simplification of calculations (for these simplifications see Goldstein 1995: 38ff and Longford
1993: 108). These simplifications provide for a gain in speed and precision of calculations. If
assumption of a strictly nested structure of clustering is given up, these simplifications are no longer
possible. Each iteration step of the estimation process then requires the inversion of a quadratic matrix
that has a number of rows and columns equal to the length of the data matrix. Apart from a big loss in
speed, numerical inaccuracies may occur. This problem is especially critical with the data at hand
where the data matrix has a length of 17337, even if the data matrix is condensed by transforming the
data into blocked format, and Greece and Eastern Germany are excluded from the analysis.
The software used has to be ‘tricked’ to estimate the parameters of a crossed-effects model. The
random effects of at least one dimension of clustering has to be represented by dummy variables with
random-coefficients. In the analyses conducted here we represented the country random-effects as
dummy variables with random-coefficients. This ‘trick’ could also be used for the estimation of a simple
two-level model. In fact, we obtained the same zero estimate of the variance parameter also in this
case.
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Both in the models for political involvement and political apathy, there is more variation between
countries than between Eurobarometer studies. However, in most models we find that the
estimate of the variance of the random effects for the Eurobarometer studies is at least twice as
large as its standard error. Thus, this variance parameter is relevant and cannot be simply
neglected. However, the estimate for the variance parameter for Eurobarometer studies is
largest if Eurobarometer studies are nested into countries. In all other models where random
effects of Eurobarometer studies are not nested into countries and thus are restricted to be the
same in all countries, the variance of these random effects is much smaller or even zero. This
strongly suggests that, as far as there is variation between studies, it is variation within
countries, while countries are the primary source of heterogeneity with respect to political
Table 2: Basic Multi-Level Models for Political Apathy
Two-level models Three-level models Crossed-
effects model
Individuals
within
countries
Individuals
within
studies
Individuals
within
countries,
countries within
studies
Individuals
within studies,
studies within
countries
Individuals
within
countries and
studies
Coefficients at
individual level
Up to 15
years
.653
(.004)
.682
(.004)
.621
(.004)
.650
(.007)
.653
(.004)
Age when
finished
full time
education *
20 years
and more
-.697
(.005)
-.726
(.005)
-.666
(.005)
-.683
(.008)
-.697
(.005)
Gender ** .331
(.003)
.313
(.003)
.314
(.003)
.331
(.003)
.277
(.005)
Prewar .038
(.005)
.014
(.005)
.035
(.005)
.045
(.010)
.041
(.005)
Silent -.245
(.006)
-.262
(.006)
-.232
(.006)
-.246
(.011)
-.243
(.006)
Lost .048
(.005)
.056
(.005)
.045
(.005)
.058
(.010)
.048
(.005)
Birth
cohort ***
Pragmatic .488
(.008)
.524
(.008)
.465
(.008)
.459
(.013)
.484
(.008)
Constant -.959
(.020)
-.905
(.015)
-.909
(.019)
-1.054
(.128)
-.938
(.006)
Parameters
Individuals 3.289 3.289 3.289 3.289 3.289
Eurobarometer studies - .013
(.002)
.000†
(.000)
.049
(.003)
.006†
(.073)
Countries .261
(.014)
- .240
(.013)
.245
(.090)
.298
(.073)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * Effect coded with 16 to 19 years as baseline category; ** effect
coded with male as baseline category; *** effect coded with protest as baseline category; † not
statistically significant; all other estimates are statistically significant at a 1% level.
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involvement or political apathy. The model that best describes the pattern of heterogeneity of
political involvement and political apathy is the three-level model in which individuals are nested
into Eurobarometer studies and Eurobarometer studies are nested into countries. With this
model as a baseline we can now consider the explanatory power of politicisation as a contextual
factor. Since most of the unexplained variance is on the country level rather than on the level of
Eurobarometer studies, the main task will be the explanation of country-specific levels of
political involvement and political interest.
5. The Explanatory Power of Politicisation
In Sections 3 and 4 the indicators of politicisation and the construction of a basic multi-level
model of political involvement and political apathy are presented. To what extent can variations
in the level of political involvement and political apathy be explained by politicisation? As it
turned out in the preceding section, the main variation at the contextual level is variation
between countries, while variation between points in time is rather modest. For this reason, we
concentrate on the explanatory power of politicisation for variation between countries.
Explanatory power with respect to variation between countries is conceptualised here
analogously to the concept of explanatory power in single-level regression: Explanatory power
at the country level refers to the relative reduction of residual variance at the level of countries.
In linear multi-level models the explanatory power could simply be measured by the relative
difference of the county-level variance parameter in a model for political involvement or political
apathy with an indicator of politicisation included compared to the respective base model
without indicators of politicisation. Yet the validity of this measure depends, first, on the absence
of variation in this indicator below country-level, and, second, on the condition that inclusion of
an additional variable into the model does not have any effects on the estimates of other
parameters. The first condition can be easily assured by including into the model only country-
specific means of any contextual variable that is to be considered. The second condition,
however, poses a more serious problem in the case of multi-level logistic regression. Any
inclusion of a predictor into the model will increase the estimates of all other parameters (see
Snijders and Bosker 1999: 227). For this reason we prefer the comparison of models in terms of
their respective country-level intra-class correlation rather than in terms of their respective
country-level variance parameter. To obtain the relative reduction of the country-level variance
parameter we compute:
reldiff(σ(country)) = (σ(country,0) - σ(country,1))/σ(country,0) ,
where σ(country,0) denotes the country-level variance parameter of the basic model (without
country-level predictors), σ(country,1) denotes the country-level variance parameter for the model
with the respective indicator of politicisation included into the model. Analogously the relative
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difference of the country-level residual intra-class correlation is computed in the following way:
reldiff(ρ(country)) = (ρ(country,0) - ρ(country,1))/ρ(country,0)
Each of the dimensions of politicisation defined and operationalised in Section 3 can now be
used to test their impact on the cross-national variation in the levels of political involvement and
political apathy.
5.1 Cleavages
Cleavage as a factor of politicisation is operationalised as the state-church cleavage, the centre-
periphery cleavage, the urban-rural cleavage, and the owner-worker cleavage. As indicators for
these cleavages we employ the denominational fragmentation, the proportion of Catholics,
Protestants, and Atheists and people without a creed among the population of a country, church
attendance, ethnic fragmentation, the proportion of the ethnic majority, the relative size of the
agricultural sector, and strike activity (see Appendix).
Table 3 presents the results of the model for political involvement. Since for the data for the size
of the agricultural data is lacking for Austria and Norway, the impact of this indicator is assessed
on the basis model estimations from data of the remaining countries only. As can be seen from
Table 3, only the centre-periphery cleavage seems to have a considerable contextual effect on
political involvement. Only for the coefficients of ethnic fragmentation and of the majority-
minority balance statistically significant estimates are obtained and only the inclusion of these
measures into the model of political involvement results in a reduction of the country-level
variance parameter and the country-level residual intra-class correlation of at least about one
fourth or one third.
The effect of the cleavage structure on political apathy, however, is more pronounced (see
Table 4). In addition to the centre-periphery cleavage also the state-church cleavage shows
statistically significant effects. These effects are larger than those obtained in the case of
political involvement. Moreover, the relative reduction of residual variation between countries,
as measured by the country-level variance parameter and the intra-class correlation is larger,
too. The proportion of Catholics in a country reduces the country-level variance parameter by 50
per cent and the country-level intra-class correlation by almost 50 per cent. Although the
proportion both of Catholics and Protestants, and church attendance seem to matter for the
politicisation of society, the denominational fragmentation and the proportion of atheists and
people and without creed do not. It is unclear how to interpret these results. Since most
countries show a dominance of either Protestants or Catholics, the effect of the proportion of
Protestants almost mirrors the effect of the proportion of Catholics. Besides, the rate of church
attendance is strongly connected to the proportion of Catholics, since the institutional aspects of
the Christian creed are more important for the Catholic denomination than for the Protestant
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Table 3: Explanatory Power of Cleavages for Cross-Country Heterogeneity of Political Involvement
Country level residual variationEffects of contextual
variable Variance parameter Intra-class correlation
Estimate Standard
error
Estimate Standard
error
Relative
difference to
base model
(per cent)
Estimate Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
All countries
Base model .087** .033 .025
Contextual variables included
Denominational fragmentation .112 .076 .075** .029 13.9 .022 13.6
Proportion of Catholics -.097 .080 .078** .030 8.2 .023 8.0
Proportion of Protestants .093 .078 .079** .030 9.4 .023 9.1
Proportion of atheists and people without a creed .023 .082 .086** .033 .6 .025 .6
Church attendance -.087 .079 .080** .031 10.0 .023 9.8
Ethnic fragmentation -.147* .070 .066** .025 24.4 .019 23.9
Proportion of ethnic majority .170** .066 .058* .023 33.1 .017 32.5
Strike activity -.048 .089 .085* .033 2.0 .025 1.9
Without Austria and Norway
Base model .084* .035 .025
Relative size of agricultural sector -.119 .116 .078* .032 8.1 .023 7.9
Notes: Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also includes education, gender, and birth
cohort as individual-level predictors. The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance parameter of the Eurobarometer
studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model. Since for the data for the size
of the agricultural data is lacking for Austria and Norway, the impact of this indicator is assessed on the basis model estimations from data of the remaining
countries only.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
Table 4: Explanatory Power of Cleavages for Cross-Country Heterogeneity of Political Apathy
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Country level residual variationEffects of contextual
variable Variance parameter Intra-class correlation
Estimate Standard
error
Estimate Standard
error
Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
Estimate Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
All countries
Base model .245** .090 .068
Contextual variables included
Denominational fragmentation -.132 .128 .226** .083 7.7 .063 7.2
Proportion of Catholics .364** .094 .122** .045 50.0 .035 48.2
Proportion of Protestants -.333** .103 .145** .054 40.8 .042 39.1
Proportion of atheists and people without a creed -.121 .139 .265** .097 -8.2 .073 -7.6
Church attendance .268* .115 .182** .067 25.8 .052 24.4
Ethnic fragmentation .308** .106 .156** .058 36.4 .045 34.8
Proportion of ethnic majority -.298** .108 .162** .060 33.9 .046 32.3
Strike activity .161 .126 .220** .081 10.2 .062 9.5
Without Austria and Norway
Base model .210* .083 .059
Relative size of agricultural sector .115 .127 .193* .076 8.2 .055 7.8
Notes: Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also includes education, gender, and birth
cohort as individual-level predictors. The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance parameter of the Eurobarometer
studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model. Since for the data for the size
of the agricultural data is lacking for Austria and Norway, the impact of this indicator is assessed on the basis model estimations from data of the remaining
countries only.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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denomination. The effect of the proportion of Catholics, furthermore, is positive on political
apathy, suggesting that it is Catholicism that draws people away from the secular world of
politics. That is, it is probably not a politicisation effect of the state-church cleavage that matters
here, but rather a depoliticisation effect of Catholicsm.
Neither the effect of ethnic fragmentation nor the relative size of the ethnic majority support the
interpretation that the centre-periphery cleavage has an politicisating effect on society. Rather, a
country tends to be more politicisated the more ethnic homogenous it is. This paradoxical result
suggests that the effect of ethnicity is spurious rather than substantive.
5.2 State Intervention
State intervention can be regarded as an important factor for the politicisation of a society. In
this section we examine the influence of state intervention on country-specific levels of political
involvement and political apathy.
As can be seen from Table 5, there is no clear evidence for an effect of state intervention on
political involvement. Neither is the effect coefficient of state intervention significant, nor is the
relative reduction by any of these indices of the country-level variance parameter and the
country-level residual intra-class correlation substantial. Nevertheless, state intervention has an
statistically significant effect on political apathy (see Table 6). In addition, the direction of this
effect confirms the interpretation of state intervention as a factor of politicisation of society. The
effect coefficient is statistically significant and negative, reducing the country-level variance
parameter by at least 20 per cent. The unambiguous conclusion then, is: The higher the level of
state intervention, the lower the level of political apathy.
Table 5: Explanatory Power of State Intervention for Cross-Country Heterogeneity of
Political Involvement
Estimate Standard
error
Relative difference to baseline
model (per cent)
Effects of contextual variable
State intervention .094 .083
Country level residual variation
Variance parameter .079** .031 8.7
Residual intra-class correlation .023 8.5
Notes: The model also includes education, gender, and birth cohort as individual-level predictors.
The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance
parameter of the Eurobarometer studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ
substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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5.3 Openness of the Political System
For openness of the political system three main aspects were discerned: general democracy,
opportunity structures of constitutional political participation, and historical experiences of a
country with respect to democracy and authoritarian regimes. The explanatory power of these
aspects for political involvement and political apathy now is tested by including them into the
multi-level models.
Taking into account the large variety of indices of political system openness, their overall
performance in explaining political involvement is rather poor (see Table 7). Only the effects of
three indices of historical experience are nearly statistically significant; or rather, would be
statistically significant if a one-sided hypothesis was used. Besides, the reduction of country-
level heterogeneity by these indices is substantial. The fact that the direction of this effect is in
line with the politicisation hypothesis (high scores on this index indicate a shorter democratic
experience) suggests that the history of a country matters for the level of political involvement
among its citizens.
With respect to political apathy, the record of the indices for political openness is generally
poorer, except for the indices of democratic history (see Table 8). One of the indices of
democratic history has an statistically significant effect, which also leads to a substantial
reduction of country-level variation in political apathy.
The results concerning the effects of openness of the political system on political involvement
and political apathy can be summarised in a straightforward way: It is not the openness of the
political system that matters for the politicisation of the society, but rather the historical record of
democracy. This effect, however, is not very strong.
Table 6: Explanatory Power of State Intervention for Cross-Country Heterogeneity of
Political Apathy
Estimate Standard
error
Relative difference to baseline
model (per cent)
Effects of contextual variable -.292** .108
State intervention
Country level residual variation
Variance parameter .169** .062 31.1
Residual intra-class correlation .049 29.6
Notes: The model also includes education, gender, and birth cohort as individual-level predictors.
The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance
parameter of the Eurobarometer studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ
substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level
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Table 7: Explanatory Power of Political System Openness for Cross-Country Heterogeneity of Political Involvement
Country level residual variationEffects of contextual
variable Variance parameter Intra-class correlation
Estimate Standard
error
Estimate Standard
error
Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
Estimate Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
General democracy .110 .077 .076** .029 12.7 .022 12.4
Opportunity structures (first rotated component) .040 .079 .085* .033 1.9 .025 1.9
Opportunity structures (second rotated component) -.024 .081 .086** .033 .6 .025 .6
History of democracy (variant 1: first rotated component) -.130 .072 .070** .027 19.6 .021 19.2
History of democracy (variant 1: second rotated component) -.055 .079 .084** .032 3.5 .025 3.4
Notes: Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also includes education, gender, and birth
cohort as individual-level predictors. The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance parameter of the Eurobarometer
studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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Table 8: Explanatory Power of Political System Openness for Cross-Country Heterogeneity of Political Apathy
Country level residual variationEffects of contextual
variable Variance parameter Intra-class correlation
Estimate Standard
error
Estimate Standard
error
Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
Estimate Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
General democracy -.103 .131 .238** .087 3.0 .066 2.7
Opportunity structures (first rotated component) .141 .128 .227** .083 7.4 .064 6.9
Opportunity structures (second rotated component) -.023 .133 .247** .091 -1.1 .069 -1.0
History of democracy (variant 1: first rotated component) .240* .118 .193** .071 21.0 .055 19.9
History of democracy (variant 1: second rotated component) -.060 .133 .245** .090 .0 .068 .0
Notes: Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also includes education, gender, and birth
cohort as individual-level predictors. The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance parameter of the Eurobarometer
studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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5.4 Control Capacity of the State
Four aspects of political systems affect control capacity of the state: centralism vs. federalism,
institutional constraints, stability and effectiveness of governments, and structures of interest
mediation. In a similar way as was done in the previous sub-sections, these four aspects are
now introduced in the multi-level models for political involvement and apathy.
As can be seen from Table 9 control capacity of the state does not explain cross-country
variation in the level of political involvement. None of the effect coefficients of the indices of the
various aspects of control capacity shows a statistically significant estimate or a substantial
reduction of the country-level variance parameter and county-level intra-class correlation.
However, the results concerning political apathy look somewhat different (see Table 10). The
estimate of the effect coefficient for interest mediation is statistically significant and reduces the
country-level variance parameter and the country-level intra-class correlation by at least 20 per
cent. The direction of the coefficient indicates that institutionalised structures of interest
mediation are associated with low levels of political apathy. In addition, the effect of the second
government stability and effectiveness dimension, on which only measures of cabinet durability
have high loadings, would be significant if tested against a one-sided null-hypothesis. This
factor, too, explains almost 20 per cent of the cross-country variation of political apathy.
As far as the control capacity of the state is concerned, the aspect of political interest that is
affected by this contextual properties of countries is political apathy. Among the dimensions of
control capacity it is only the dimension of structures of interest mediation that clearly has an
effect on political apathy. Cabinet stability may have an effect, but it cannot be statistically
assured on the basis of our sample.
5.5 The Role of the State Revisited
No general conclusions concerning the role of the state can be formulated on the basis of the
analyses presented above. The level of state intervention clearly affects the level of political
apathy in a country, but it does not affect political involvement. None of the other general
aspects shows an effect either on political involvement or on political apathy. This is hardly
astonishing, since it is very difficult to construct valid measures of general openness of the
political system or general control capacity of the state. The principle-components analyses
presented in the Appendix show that both openness of the political system and control capacity
of the state have several sub-dimensions that vary independently. It was mainly only one of
these sub-dimensions proves to be relevant for political involvement and political apathy. Thus
the state does not have a politicising effect in general, but only specific aspects of the role of the
state show some impact on political apathy.
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Table 9: Explanatory Power of Control Capacity of the State for Cross-Country Heterogeneity of Political Involvement
Country level residual variationEffects of contextual
variable Variance parameter Intra-class correlation
Estimate Standard
error
Estimate Standard
error
Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
Estimate Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
Centralism/federalism -.026 .080 .086** .033 .8 .025 .7
Institutional constraints .056 .080 .084** .032 3.4 .025 3.3
Government effectiveness .076 .079 .082** .031 6.3 .024 6.1
Government stability .009 .080 .087** .033 .1 .025 .1
Interest mediation .035 .085 .086** .033 1.1 .025 1.1
Notes: Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also includes education, gender, and birth
cohort as individual-level predictors. The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance parameter of the Eurobarometer
studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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Table 10: Explanatory Power of Control Capacity of the State Openness for Cross-Country Heterogeneity of Political Apathy
Country level residual variationEffects of contextual
variable Variance parameter Intra-class correlation
Estimate Standard
error
Estimate Standard
error
Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
Estimate Relative
difference to
baseline
model
(per cent)
Centralism/Federalism .139 .124 .214** .079 12.6 .060 11.8
Institutional constraints -.021 .129 .231** .085 5.7 .065 5.3
Government effectiveness -.045 .134 .248** .091 -1.1 .069 -1.1
Government stability -.224 .119 .197** .073 19.5 .056 18.4
Interest mediation -.243* .118 .192** .071 21.5 .054 20.4
Notes: Each line in the table represents a model that contains a different contextual variable as predictor. Each model also includes education, gender, and birth
cohort as individual-level predictors. The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance parameter of the Eurobarometer
studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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5.6 Modernisation
The level of political interest in a country could reflect its stage in the general process of
modernisation. If that were the case, the levels of political involvement increase and the levels
of political apathy decline as countries develop. Before we consider the combined effect of
several indicators of politicisation, the impact of modernisation on political involvement and
political apathy will be tested here by introducing into the multi-level modelsan indicator for the
stages of countries in this process.
The level of modernisation is so far the best predictor for country-specific levels of political
involvement. The estimated effect is clearly statistically significant (see Table 11). In addition,
both the country-level variance parameter and the country-level intra-class correlation are
reduced by almost one third. The impact of modernisation on political apathy seems to be even
stronger (see Table 12). Here the estimate for the effect coefficient is statistically significant
even at a one-percent level. Both the variance parameter and the residual intra-class correlation
are reduced by around 30 per cent. From these analysis it follows that the socio-economic
development of European countries has to be taken into account as a substantial factor
explaining cross-national differences in political involvement and political apathy. Apparently,
politicisation is not to be considered as the only way to explain contextual variation in the level
of political interest among citizens, since direct effects of modernisation can be traced clearly.
Table 11: Explanatory Power of Modernisation of Society for Cross-Country
Heterogeneity of Political Involvement
Estimate Standard
error
Relative difference to baseline
model
(per cent)
Effects of contextual variable
Modernisation .159* .079
Country level residual variation
Variance parameter .067* .026 22.6
Residual intra-class correlation .020 22.1
Notes: The model also includes education, gender, and birth cohort as individual-level predictors.
The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance
parameter of the Eurobarometer studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ
substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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6. Combining Contextual Factors
In the previous sections contextual variables relevant for explaining cross-country variations in
political involvement and political apathy are considered. So far we dealt with models with single
contextual variables and we now turn to models with multiple contextual predictors for two
reasons. First, some of the uncontrolled, direct (‘zero-order’) effects that turned out to be
statistically significant may be spurious. Second, the explanatory  power of the single contextual
predictors so far was rather limited. The combination of predictors might enhance the
explanatory power of the models while sorting out spurious effects.
In the search for models for political involvement and political apathy combining all relevant
predictors, a stepwise approach is followed. In a first step all contextual variables that turned out
as significant predictors are introduced into comprehensive models of political involvement or
political apathy. In a second step, all predictors are dropped that appear to be insignificant in
these comprehensive models. If the direction of certain effects does not allow a stringent
interpretation, further modification of the models are applied in a third step. The result of these
three steps is a final model for political involvement and a final model for political apathy. To
conclude this procedure we assess the explanatory power by comparison of predicted and
actual levels of political involvement and political apathy in Europe.
Table 12: Explanatory Power of Modernisation of Society Openness for Cross-Country
Heterogeneity of Political Apathy
Estimate Standard
error
Relative difference to baseline
model
(per cent)
Effects of contextual variable
Modernisation -.332** .105
Country level residual variation
Variance parameter .148** .055 39.7
Residual intra-class correlation .042 38.1
Notes: The model also includes education, gender, and birth cohort as individual-level predictors.
The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance
parameter of the Eurobarometer studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ
substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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Collecting all predictors that show a significant effect on political involvement into a
comprehensive model results in a model that contains only two country-level predictors, the
level of modernisation and the proportion of ethnic majority. Both these predictors are significant
in this comprehensive model (see Table 13). In addition, the variance parameter and the
residual intra-class correlation are reduced by 50 per cent relative to the baseline model of
political involvement. But in this comprehensive model the direction of the effect of the
proportion of ethnic majority does not conform with the notion of cleavages as a factor of
politicisation. We suspect that the effect of the proportion of ethnic majority is spurious because
Belgium shows a low level of political involvement relative to its level of modernisation and an
extremely low score on the index of ethnic homogeneity. Indeed, if the proportion of the ethnic
majority is substituted by a dummy for Belgium, the loss of explained cross-country
Table 14: The Final Model for Political Involvement
Estimate Standard
error
Relative difference to baseline
model
(per cent)
Effects of contextual variables
Belgium dummy -0.481* 0.232
Modernisation 0.158** 0.068
Country level residual variation
Variance parameter 0.049* 0.019 44.4
Residual intra-class correlation 0.014 43.8
Notes: The model also includes education, gender, and birth cohort as individual-level predictors.
The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance
parameter of the Eurobarometer studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ
substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
Table 13: A Comprehensive Model for Political Involvement
Estimate Standard
error
Relative difference to baseline
model
(per cent)
Effects of contextual variables
Proportion of ethnic majority 0.154** 0.057
Modernisation 0.142* 0.064
Country level residual variation
Variance parameter 0.043* 0.017 50.9
Residual intra-class correlation 0.013 50.2
Notes: The model also includes education, gender, and birth cohort as individual-level predictors.
The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance
parameter of the Eurobarometer studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ
substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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heterogeneity is minimal. The country-level variance parameter increases from 0.042 to 0.048,
a difference that is smaller than one standard error. Besides, the residual intra-class correlation
increases from 0.013 to 0.014. The reduction of unexplained variation between countries still is
substantial as the relative differences of the country-level variance parameter and intra-class
correlation relative to the baseline model show.  Thus, the indicator for ethnic cleavages can be
dropped with the result that our final model contains only one country-level predictor, the level of
modernisation. In addition it only contains a dummy-variable for Belgium (see Table 14).
Does the final model explain variations across countries with respect to political involvement? A
comparison between predicted and actual levels of political involvement in the countries
covered by the model provides an answer to this question. Figure 2 compares observed
proportions of people classified as politically involved with proportions predicted by variables at
the individual level and by the complete final model developed above. Only those countries are
included that are used in the estimation of the parameters of the model. So Belgium is not
included in the figure since it was represented by a dummy variable. Obviously, predictions by
education, gender, and birth cohort do not explain variations across countries very well. These
predictions do not depart much from the overall mean of the countries. However, predictions by
the complete model, that is, by education, gender, birth cohort and the level of modernisation,
explain variations between countries much better. Although there are deviations for some
countries from the model, these deviations are generally smaller than the deviations of the
respective countries form the mean of all countries.
Figure 2: Observed and Predicted Proportions of Politically Involved Responents
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We now turn to the construction of a final model for political apathy. As turned out in Section 4,
nine country-level predictors showed a statistically significant unconditional effect on political
apathy. If we include all these predictors into a single model we instantly observe that several
predictors are redundant (see Table 15). Three predictors are related to the state-church
cleavage, but only one of them, the proportion of Catholics, is statistically significant. Therefore,
only the proportion of Catholics should be retained in the model. Two predictors are related to
centre-periphery cleavages, but they are both statistically insignificant. Since both predictors are
strongly related, their insignificance may be the result of collinearity. Therefore we drop only one
of them, ethnic fragmentation, the effect of which is smaller than that of the proportion of the
ethnic majority. Interest mediation and history of democracy also do not have statistically
significant effects and are dropped from the model. This results in a model that contains four
country-level predictors. As Table 16 shows, all predictors of this reduced model are statistically
significant and the loss of explanatory power is minimal. The country-level variance parameter
increases by only one standard error while the country-level residual intra-class correlation
changes hardly at all.
Nevertheless, this model still has some features that call for its modification. As we noted
already above, the direction of the effect of the proportion of ethnic majority is not consistent
Table 15: A Comprehensive Model for Political Apathy
Estimate Standard
error
Relative difference to baseline
model
(per cent)
Effects of contextual variables
Proportion of Catholics 0.330** 0.115
Proportion of Protestants 0.190 0.131
Church attendance 0.086 0.136
Ethnic fragmentation 0.050 0.256
Proportion of ethnic majority -0.225 0.249
State intervention 0.282* 0.138
History of democracy 0.052 0.077
Interest mediation -0.127 0.117
Modernisation -0.356* 0.138
Country level residual variation
Variance parameter 0.025* 0.010 89.8
Residual intra-class correlation 0.007 89.2
Notes: The model also includes education, gender, and birth cohort as individual-level predictors.
The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance
parameter of the Eurobarometer studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ
substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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with the notion of cleavages as factors of politicisation. Again, this predictor should be
substituted by a dummy variable for Belgium. Beside, the conditional effect of state intervention
is opposite to its unconditional effect. We do not accept that this is a substantive result but
assume that it is rather a side effect of a high leverage of some countries for the conditional
effect of state intervention on political apathy and of collinearity of this variable with the level of
modernisation. Indeed, if the effect of the proportion of the ethnic majority is substituted by a
dummy variable for Belgium, the paradoxical effect of state intervention, while still being of
considerable size, becomes statistically insignificant. The paradoxical effect of state intervention
almost vanishes if dummy variables for Greece and West Germany are included (see Table
17).13 Since the effect of the proportion of Catholics becomes insignificant, too, we again end up
with a model that contains only one true country-level predictor, the level of modernisation and
dummy variables for several countries (see Table 18).
                                                     
13 Dummy variables for other countries did not turn out to be significant, or only in the case that state
intervention was present in the model.
Table 16: The Comprehensive Model for Political Apathy after Deleting Variables without
Significant Effects
Estimate Standard
error
Relative difference to baseline
model
(per cent)
Effects of contextual variables
Proportion of Catholics 0.264** 0.067
Proportion of ethnic majority -0.230** 0.054
State intervention 0.273** 0.105
Modernisation -0.440** 0.098
Country level residual variation
Variance parameter 0.035** 0.013 85.7
Residual intra-class correlation 0.010 84.9
Notes: The model also includes education, gender, and birth cohort as individual-level predictors.
The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance
parameter of the Eurobarometer studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ
substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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Table 17: The Model for Political Apathy after Substituting the Proportion of the Ethnic
Majority by a Dummy Variable for Belgium and Including Dummy Variables
for Greece and West Germany
Estimate Standard
error
Relative difference to base
model (per cent)
Effects of contextual variables
Belgium dummy 0.649** 0.146
Greece dummy -0.839** 0.257
West Germany dummy -0.700** 0.141
Proportion of Catholics 0.102 0.077
Modernisation -0.419** 0.071
State intervention 0.052 0.098
Country level residual variation
Variance parameter 0.017* 0.007 93.1
Residual intra-class correlation 0.005 92.6
Notes: The model also includes education, gender, and birth cohort as individual-level
predictors. The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of
the variance parameter of the Eurobarometer studies are omitted from the table
because they do not differ substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline
model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
Table 18: The Final Model for Political Apathy
Estimate Standard
error
Relative difference to base
model (per cent)
Effects of contextual variables
Modernisation -0.446** 0.045
Belgium dummy 0.714** 0.150
Greece dummy -1.090** 0.168
West Germany dummy -0.720** 0.150
Country level residual variation
Variance parameter 0.020** 0.008 91.9
Residual intra-class correlation 0.006 91.4
Notes: The model also includes education, gender, and birth cohort as individual-level predictors.
The estimates of the effects of these variables as well as the estimate of the variance
parameter of the Eurobarometer studies are omitted from the table because they do not differ
substantially from the estimates obtained for the baseline model.
** Significant at 1% level; * significant at 5% level.
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Obviously a model with dummy effects for certain countries will perfectly fit the levels of political
apathy in these countries. But does this model offer a reasonable explanation for the variation of
country-specific levels of political apathy in the set of the remaining countries? According to the
estimate of the variance parameter and the residual intra-class correlation the answer should be
positive. But still, a closer look may be worthwhile. Again such closer look is provided by a
comparison of predicted and actual proportion of politically apathetic people in the countries
covered by the model given in Figure 3. It instantly becomes clear from this figure that variations
between the countries with respect to the levels of political apathy are much larger than the
variations with respect to the levels of political involvement. In addition, it turns out nicely that
the explanatory power of education, gender, and birth cohort does not suffice to explain these
variations across countries. The impact of the single contextual variable that is present in the
model serves very well in explaining these variations. Deviations of country-specific proportions
of political apathetic people from the proportions predicted by education, gender, birth cohort
and the level of modernisation are quite small relative to their full range. Thus we conclude, first,
that there are variations between countries with respect to political apathy that cannot be
attributed to the impact of individual-level predictors, and, second, that these variations can –
with the exception of only a small set of countries, largely be accounted for by the countries’
level of modernisation. If this last process is considered and the very specific circumstances in
some countries are taken into account, the effects of societal politicisation disappears
completely from the models developed here.
Figure 3: Observed and Predicted Predicted Proportions of Politically Apathetic
Respondents
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7. In Conclusion
A minimal degree of political interest among citizens is an important precondition for the stability
and development of democratic political societies. Usually, political involvement and political
apathy are depicted as attributes of individuals that can be explained by referring to the
resources and skills of the people concerned. The analyses presented here are based on a
critical assessment of these approaches in cross-national and longitudinal comparisons in
Europe in the last few decades. In addition to these commonly used ‘push theories’ (for instance
suggesting that education instigates political interest), ‘pull theories’ or goal-oriented theories
are used here relying on the presumption that government intervention activates political
interest and that contextual factors have to be taken into account. Therefore, a contextual model
is presented emphasising the relevance of distinct degrees of politicisation in different societal
settings in addition to the traditional socio-demographic factors (education, date of birth, and
gender) at the micro-level.
The results from the application of sophisticated multi-level models to the development of
political interest in Europe in the last three decades can be summarised in several points. First,
the conclusion that the concepts political involvement and political apathy refer to different
phenomena is confirmed once again. Not only is the level of political apathy higher than the
level of political involvement in most countries, but political apathy also shows much more
cross-national variation than political involvement. Moreover, macro-level indicators appear to
be more relevant for political apathy than for political involvement. A second conclusion refers to
the relative importance of cross-national differences as compared to longitudinal developments.
The application of straightforward multi-level models based on the distinction between
individuals, countries, and points in time, makes clear that cross-national differences are far
more relevant than distinctions between points in time. For that reason, we concentrated the
development on multi-level models of cross-national differences. The third conclusion refers to
the fact that only a few entrances on the long list of indicators for politicisation actually show
some impact on the level of political interest after individual factors are taken into account. In
addition, not all of the indicators for politicisation that show influence on political involvement or
political apathy do so in a direction in accordance with the hypothesis. Although the support for
the politicisation hypothesis is limited, this does not lead to an outright rejection of the
hypothesis. State intervention does have an influence on political involvement, the experience
of democracy of a country as well as its structures of interest mediation have an influence on
political apathy – influences as expected on the basis of the politicisation hypothesis. However,
the strongest contextual-level predictor is socio-economic modernisation.
The most noteworthy conclusion from the analyses presented here is the remarkable
disappearance of the impact of politicisation when the level of socio-economic development of
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each country is included in our multi-level models. Although this result can only be obtained
after deleting one or more ‘problematic’ cases (like Belgium and Greece) from the analyses, it is
clear that for virtually all European societies the degree of modernisation has a clear impact on
the level of political involvement and – even more stronger – on the level of political apathy. The
higher the level of socio-economic development, the higher the aggregate level of political
involvement and the lower the level of political apathy. Individual-level factors like education,
gender, and date of birth are taken into account to arrive at this conclusion. Yet, none of the
various indicators for politicisation (cleavages, state intervention, openness of the political
system, control capacity of the state) play an important role in explanations of cross-national
differences in political interest in Europe. In other words: The politicisation thesis, which states
that the level of political interest among citizens is a positive and monotonous function of the
relevance of societal and political arrangements in a society, is not supported by the empirical
findings presented here.
Political interest is a basic prerequisite for the survival and further development of the
democratic political system. Already in the 1950s authors like Lipset (1959) suggested that
especially socio-economic development increases chances of transitions to democracy. Our
results show that socio-economic development has a continuing impact even when democracy
is already established.
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Appendix: Operationalisation of Politicisation
The operationalisation of politicisation involves several steps. On a more abstract level, we
distinguish between cleavage structure, state intervention, openness of the political system, and
control capacity of the state. Except for state intervention, all these dimensions of politicisation
can be further decomposed into sub-dimensions. These sub-dimensions finally are
operationalised by measures from various sources. Indices for these sub-dimensions are
constructed on the base of principle-components analyses. Figure 1 (main text) provides an
overview of the specification of concepts, dimensions, sub-dimensions, and indicators used.
A. Cleavages
As indicated, cleavages are those deep-rooted divisions within society that have structured
political conflict and competition. Although Lipset and Rokkan (1967) describe how overlaps and
cross-cuttings of cleavages gave rise to both nation-specific and common structures of party
systems and voter alignments in European democracies, no suggestions are presented how to
operationalise cleavages at the individual level.14 With the aid of the work of Rae and Taylor
(1970), however, an interpretation of cleavages in terms of measurable features of a society can
be established, creating a concept out of a metaphor.15 Among the attributes of cleavages
discussed by Rae and Taylor three are of special interest when considering cleavages as an
aspect of politicisation. These attributes are (i) the fragmentation of a society on the basis of a
cleavage, (ii) the crystallisation of a cleavage in a society, and (iii) the intensity of the cleavage
(in terms of political conflict). In addition to the attributes developed by Rae and Taylor one may
also measure the balance of a cleavage; that is, the advantage that one of the groups involved
compared to other groups has in terms of mass support. If cleavages give rise to political
conflict, they are a significant aspect of the degree of politicisation of society.
Is this way, four attributes of cleavages that allow quantitative measurement at the macro-level
can be obtained. Three of these attributes – fragmenation, crystallisation, and intensity – are
taken from Rae and Taylor (1970). Fragmentation can be defined and measured as the
probability that two individuals chosen at random belong to different groups defined by a
cleavage (Rae and Taylor 1990: 2). If p1, ..., pk represent the relative shares of these groups of
a country’s total population, this measure is: F = 1- (p12+...+pk2) (Rae and Taylor 1990: 25).
Crystallisation of a cleavage is measured as the proportion of the population of a country
                                                     
14  On the one hand, the authors refer to bodies of more or less organized and established elites that lead
or embody certain segments of society, for example parliamentary groups that embody or are affiliated
with certain interest groups. On the other hand, they refer to social movement originating outside the
structures of established political institutions (Lipset and Rokan 1967: 33ff.).
15 Rae and Taylor deal mainly with political cleavages, but since they pay attention to cleavages in a
formal and general way and develop concepts of attributes of cleavages, their approach can be used to
obtain quantitative indices.
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affected by a cleavage (Rae and Taylor 1990: 2). This measure can be constructed only if it is
possible not to have a position on the respective cleavage. If this is the case the definition of
this measure is straightforward and is simply operationalised as the proportion of people
affected by the cleavage among the total population (Rae and Taylor 1990: 24).  With the
intensity of a cleavage Rae and Taylor refer to the intensity to which members of distinct groups
are opposed to each other (Rae and Taylor 1990: 2). The index of intensity of a cleavage that
they propose requires that there is data available on how strong individuals hold a position on a
cleavage, which is at least of ordinal quality (Rae and Taylor 1990: 72). Data of this quality
usually is not available for social cleavages. Therefore, we will not use the index of intensity that
Rae and Taylor propose but will rely on indirect measures for a specific cleavage.
The additional fourth attribute of cleavages that we use in our analyses is their balance; that is,
the relative support one side of the cleavage has in the population of a country as opposed to
the groups on the other sides. Comparison of countries with respect to the balance of a
cleavage makes sense only if some sort of equivalence can be established between certain
groups in different countries. For example one may compare countries with respect to the
proportion of protestants vs. other denominational groups in a country, or one may compare
countries with respect to the proportion of the ethnic majority.
In their seminal introduction to ‘Party Systems and Voter Alignments’ Lipset and Rokkan (1967)
mention four main lines of cleavage that emerge during the transition of West European polities
into modernity. These lines are the state-church cleavage, the center-periphery cleavage, the
urban-rural cleavage, and the owner-worker cleavage. For each of these four cleavages, the
four attributes mentioned will be used to obtain indicators to cover this aspect of politicisation.
A.1 State-Church Cleavages
The state-church cleavage represents the oldest of the four lines of cleavage. Its emergence is
connected with the building of the modern state as a sovereign political entity. State-building
implied a conflict about the authority over church organisations with the centre of the Catholic
church in Rome. In some countries, this conflict was resolved by the fact that, as a
consequence of the Reformation, state-building elites gained power over the country’s church
organisation by forming an established church. In other countries this conflict about authority
was resolved because state-building remained faithful to the Catholic creed and accepted at
least a symbolic by the pre-eminence of Papal authority. These different historical arrangements
of the relation between church and state had different implications for new conflicts related to
processes of nation-building that prevail in the nineteenth century. These new conflicts focussed
especially on the control over the expanding institutions of mass education. In countries with an
established church, these conflicts took place between a relatively liberalised state church and
non-conformist and revivalist minority churches with a more fundamentalist orientation. In
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Catholic countries this conflict took place between a secularised state and the Catholic church.
The conflicts between church and state or between state-recognised and independent churches
gave rise to cleavages between secular and religious parts of the population and between
different denominations. Therefore, fragmentation with respect to the state-church cleavage can
be operationalised as denominational fragmentation.  For this purpose, various indices are
available in the literature. In addition, we also constructed measures of denominational
fragmentation following the suggestions of Rae and Taylor (1970). With regards to two aspects
of this cleavage, several measures of balance of the cleavage can be constructed: the
proportion of Catholics, the proportion of Protestants including Anglicans, the proportion of
people without creed including atheists, and the proportion of people regularly attending church.
The proportion of Catholics can be considered as a measure of the relative support for trans-
national oriented Catholic church arrangements against more or less secular national
orientations. The proportion of Protestants can be considered as a measure of the relative
support for a church controlled by the state. Finally, the proportion of people without creed and
the rate of church attendance can be used as measures of the potential opposition to a more or
less secular state. We will deal with the construction of an indicator for each of these aspects of
the church-state cleavage, starting with the construction of an indicator of denominational
fragmentation. The construction of these indicators rests mainly on principle-components
analyses in order to test the internal coherence among the various measures.
Table A.1 shows construction of a summary measure of denominational fragmentation. First,
measures of denominational fragmentation, gathered from various sources are subjected to
principle-components analysis. As becomes clear from the table a one-dimensional model
comprising these measures is very well supported by the data. All loadings of the measures on
the first principle component are larger than 0.9. In addition the eigenvalue corresponding to the
first principle component is the only one larger than one and corresponds to a 93.9 per cent
explained variance. Thus the combination of this measures into a single indicator (factor scores)
is validated.
In the same way, summary measures for the other aspects of the state-church cleavage are
constructed. For the measures of the proportion of Catholics (see Table A.2), for the measures
of the proportion of Protestants (see Table A.3) for the proportion of atheists and people without
a creed (see Table A.4) a one-dimensional solution of a principle-components analysis is clearly
supported. All measures have high loadings on the first principle component, which has a very
high eigenvalue corresponding to at least 99 per cent explained variance.
The construction of an index for church attendance based on factor scores is impossible since
measures for church attendance are available only for a small subset of countries. Therefore,
the construction of a meaningful correlation matrix of the original measures was impossible. On
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Table A.1:  Indicators for Fragmentation of State-Church Cleavages
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label Loadings*
Confessional fragmentation
mid-1970
Calculated from Barnett (1982) CONFR70 .992
Confessional fragmentation
mid-1975
Calculated from Barrett (1982) CONFR75 .991
Confessional fragmentation
mid-1980
Calculated from Barrett (1982) CONFR80 .986
Confessional fragmentation 1960s Calculated from Taylor and
Hudson (1972) after Lane and
Ersson (1995)
CONFRAG .902
Eigenvalue
No. 1
3.754
Percentage of
variance
93.9
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Denominational fragmentation Factor scores on the base of first principle
component
DFRSCO
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
Table A.2: Indicators for Balance of State-Church Cleavages: Percentage of Catholics
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label Loadings*
Percentage of Catholics among
country’s population mid-1970
Barrett (1982) CATH70 .999
Percentage of Catholics among
country’s population mid-1975
Barrett (1982) CATH75 .999
Percentage of Catholics among
country’s population mid-1980
Barrett (1982) CATH80 .999
Percentage of Catholics among
country’s population 1960s
Taylor and Hudson (1972) after
Lane and Ersson (1995)
CATHPERC .999
Eigenvalue
No. 1
3.996
Percentage of
variance
99.9
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Proportion of Catholics Factor scores on the base of first principle
component
CTHSCO
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
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Table A.3: Indicators for Balance of State-Church Cleavages: Percentage of Protestants
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label Loadings*
Percentage of Protestants among
country’s population mid-1970
Barrett (1982) PROT70 .999
Percentage of Protestants among
country’s population mid-1975
Barrett (1982) PROT75 .999
Percentage of Protestants among
country’s population mid-1980
Barrett (1982) PROT80 .998
Percentage Protestants among
country’s population 1960s
Taylor and Hudson (1972)
after Lane and Ersson (1995)
PROTPERC .991
Eigenvalue
No. 1
3.976
Percentage of
variance
99.4
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Proportion of Protestants Factor scores on the base of first principle
component
PRTSCO
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
Table A.4: Indicators for Balance of State-Church Cleavages: Percentage of Atheists and
People without A Creed
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label Loadings*
Percentage of atheists and persons without a
creed among country’s population mid-1970
Barrett (1982) NOCR70 .991
Percentage of atheists and persons without a
creed among country’s population mid-1975
Barrett (1982) NOCR75 .999
Percentage of atheists and persons without a
creed among country’s population mid-1980
Barrett (1982) NOCR80 .995
Eigenvalue
No. 1 2.970
Percentage of
variance
99.0
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Proportion of atheists and people without a creed Factor scores on the base of
first principle component
NCRSCO
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
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the other hand, for all of the countries covered in our analyses at least one of the measures is
available. For these reasons, an index of church attendance is constructed as the mean of all
valid measures of church attendance for each country (see Table A.5).
A.2 Centre-Periphery Cleavages
The centre-periphery cleavage also is rooted in the process of state-building and nation-
building. This cleavage reflects, first of all, the fact that the establishment of a sovereign state
authority in a larger geographical area presupposes the subjection of local leaders and the
nobility to central structures of authority. Subsequently, this cleavage gained more momentum
in the nation-building processes of the nineteenth century. Extension of mass education not only
provoked conflicts over the question whether people should be educated according to principles
of Christian faith, but also which cultural patterns and skills should be taught, especially which
language should prevail in school. Here, the central authorities’ intentions to establish a
homogeneous national culture collide with the strive of people in peripheral areas to maintain
Table A.5: Indicators for Crystallisation of State-Church Cleavages: Church Attendance
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label
Church attendance of male persons in 1981 acc. to
European Values Survey
Lane and Ersson (1995) ECHATTM
Church attendance of female persons in 1981 acc.
to
European Values Survey
Lane and Ersson (1995) ECHATTW
Female church attendance in 1971 according to
Inglehart (1977)
Lane and Ersson (1995) ICHATTW
Male church attendance between 1973 and 1976
after Political Action 8-Nation Study
Lane and Ersson (1995) PACHATTM
Female church attendance between 1973 and
1976 after Political Action 8-Nation Study
Lane and Ersson (1995) PACHATTW
Male church attendance in 1968 after Social
Compass
Lane and Ersson (1995) SCCHATTM
Female church attendance in 1968 after Social
Compass
Lane and Ersson (1995) SCCHATTW
Male church attendance late 1960s/early 1970s,
various surveys
Lane and Ersson (1995) VCHATTM
Female church attendance late 1960s/early 1970s,
various surveys
Lane and Ersson (1995) VCHATTW
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Church attendance Mean across all variables for each country,
standardised over all countries, only valid
values used
CHTSCO
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Table A.6 : Indicators for Fragmentation of Centre-Periphery Cleavages : Ethnic
Fragmentation
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label Loadings*
Ethnic fragmentation 1920 Calculated from Tesnière (1928)
after Lane and Ersson (1995)
ETHFRG1 .929
Ethnic fragmentation 1960s Calculated from Taylor and
Hudson (1972) after Lane and
Ersson (1995)
ETHFRG2 .965
Ethnic fragmentation 1970s Calculated from data in Stephens
(1976) by Lane and Ersson (1995)
ETHFRG3 .854
Ethnic fragmentation 1991 Calculated from Eurostat data
reported by Boden (1993)
ETHNEUST .942
Ethnic fragmentation 1970s Calculated from Barrett (1982) ETHNWCE .953
Eigenvalue
No. 1
4.319
Percentage of
variance
86.4
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Ethnic fragmentation Factor scores on the base of first principle
component
ETFSCO
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
Table A.7: Indicators for Balance of Centre-Periphery Cleavages : The Relative Size of
Ethnic Majorities
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label Loadings*
Percentage of population using
dominant language 1950s
Rustow (1967) after Lane and
Ersson (1995)
ETHPERC1 .975
Percentage of population using
dominant language 1970s
Barrett (1982) after Lane and
Ersson (1995)
ETHPERC2 .975
Eigenvalue
No. 1
1.903
Percentage of
variance
95.2
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Share of ethnic majority Factor scores on the base of first principle
component
ETPSCO
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
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their cultural identity. While there are always regional varieties within a certain ethnicity, conflicts
of this kind are especially fierce in multi-ethnic countries, for example in France, Great Britain,
and Belgium. Both France and Great Britain have a ‘Celtic fringe’, Brittany in the case of
France, and Scotland and Wales in the case of Great Britain. Belgium has two major language
groups, the Flams and the Walloons. Thus, the most plausible operationalisation of the centre-
periphery cleavage is in terms of ethnic composition. One may consider the ethnic
fragmentation of a country as well as the balance between a central, majoritarian ethnicity and
the peripheric, minoritarian ethnicities.
In order to assess whether the combination of original measures obtained from various sources
into a single summary indicator of ethnic fragmentation is valid, a principle-components analysis
is carried out. As Table A.6 shows, there are good reasons for the construction of such an
indicator. The loadings of all original measures on the first principle component are quite large,
and the eigenvalue of the first principle component indicates that it explains more that 85 per
cent of the variance of the original measures. Thus, a summary indicator for ethnic
fragmentation is constructed using factor scores on this principle component.
The construction of a summary indicator for the ethnic majority’s share of the total population
also gets strong support from a principle-components analysis (see Table A.7). In this case, too,
a summary indicator is constructed on the basis of factor scores.
A.3 Urban-Rural Cleavages
The urban-rural cleavage is an outcome of the industrial revolution. While in earlier centuries
there always existed a divergence between the interests of the land-owning aristocracy and of
the bourgeois merchants in towns, this divergence amounts to open political conflict in the
nineteenth century. The interests of the new industrial bourgeoisie in cheap labour, which
depended partly on cheap agricultural products, clashed with landed gentry’s interests in high
returns on the possession of land. This conflict of interests became manifest in the political
Table A.8: The Indicator for Balance of Urban-Rural Cleavages: The Relative Size of the
Agricultural Sector
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label
Proportion of Workforce
employed in agriculture
Calculated after OECD: Annual Labour Force
Statistics
EMPLAGRA
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Relative size of agricultural
sector
Same as above EMPLAGRA
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struggle over the maintenance of tariffs for imported agricultural products in the nineteenth
century. To some degree, policy differences with respect to agricultural subsidies still are
related to this cleavage. Unfortunately, only one type of measures is available for the cleavage
between landed and industrial interests: the relative size of the primary sector in a economy,
and even this measure is not available for Norway and Austria. The source of this single
measure for urban-rural cleavages is shown in Table A.8.
A.4 Owner-Worker Cleavages
The last of the four major lines of cleavage is the owner-worker cleavage. The existence of this
cleavage is also a result of the industrial revolution. In the nineteenth century large proportions
of the population moved from the countryside to towns and cities, many of them loosing or
abandoning their prior rural bases of subsistence. The content of conflicts between workers and
owners of factories is very well known. Workers on the one hand strive for higher wages, while
owners of capital try to keep wages down in order to maximize the return on capital. The
political significance of this cleavage is related to the intensity of the conflicts between capital
and labour. Strike activity is the most appropriate indicator for the intensity of these conflicts in a
country.
Table A.9: Indicators for Intensity of Owner-Worker Cleavages: Strike Activity
a) Original measures Principle-components
analyses
I II
Variable Source Label Loadings* Loadings*
Strike activity: days lost per
1000 workers, average  1973-
1996
Eurostat (1998) STRIKEDA .875 .971
Strike activity: workers involved
per 1000 workers, average
1973-1996
Eurostat (1998) STRIKEWO .940 .971
Index of strike activity,
average 1960-1996
ILO: Yearbook of Labour
Statistics after Armigeon,
Beyeler et al. (1999)
STRIKE .948
Eigenvalue
No. 1
2.550 1.886
Percentage of
variance
85.0 94.3
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Strike activity Factor scores on the base of first principle
component of analysis II
STRSCO
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
Arbei tspapiere  -  Mannheimer Zentrum fü r  Europäische Sozia l fo rschung  36
- 51 -
Three measures are available for strike activity. Whether it is valid to combine these measures
into a summary indicator is examined, again, by principle-components analysis. As can be seen
from Table A.9 the measures fit nicely into a one-dimensional model. However, since the strike
activity index of Armigeon, Beyerler et. al (1999) lacks data for Austria, our index of strike
activity is constructed on the basis of factor scores derived from a principle-components
analysis of the two remaining measures of strike activity from Eurostat (1998).
B. State Intervention
State intervention refers to the degree to which the state is involved in economic and social
processes in a country. Three ways of state-involvement can be distinguished (i): the degree to
which governmental institutions extract resources from general society, (ii) the degree to which
they provide benefits and services, and (iii) the proportion of the workforce employed by
governmental institutions and state-owned firms. A prime source for measures of state
intervention are data provided by the OECD (Statistical Compendium 1999). From this source
we obtain information about government receipts as a proportion of the gross national product
as an indicator of the degree to which the state extracts resources from the society, government
Table A.10: Indicators for State Intervention
a) Original measures Principle-components
analyses
I II
Variable Source Label Loadings* Loadings*
Government final consumption
expenditure,  proportion of GDP
1968-1998
Calculated after OECD:
National Accounts II
(OECD 1999)
GOVFEXP .915 .902
Total government receipts,
proportion of GDP 1968-1998
Calculated after OECD:
National Accounts II
(OECD 1999)
GOVRECPT .863 .902
Proportion of workforce
employed in government
Calculated after: OECD
Business Sector Database
(OECD 1999)
GOVEMP .942
Eigenvalue
No. 1
2.471 1.629
Percentage of
variance
82.4 81.4
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
State intervention Country averages of factor scores on the base of
first principle component of analysis II for the period
in which the respective countries is included in the
Eurobarometer series.
INTERVA
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
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final consumption expenditure as a proportion of the gross national product as an indicator of
the degree to which the state provides benefits and services, and the proportion of the
workforce employed by governmental institutions and state-owned firms (see Table A.10).
Two principle-components analyses are conducted in order to assess the validity of a summary
measure of state intervention. The first principle-components analysis is based on all three
measures of state intervention introduced above. The result of this analysis clearly support a
one-dimensional notion of state-intervention. All three loadings are quite large and the
corresponding eigenvalue indicates that this component explains more than 80 per cent of the
variance of the three measures. For Norway, there is no data available on the proportion of the
workforce employed by governmental institution and state-owned. For this reason, a second
principle-components analysis is conducted in which this measure was not included. This
second analysis also supports a one dimensional solution: again we obtain large loadings and a
relatively large eigenvalue for the first principle component. Factor scores of this analysis are
used to construct a summary measure of state intervention.
C. Political System Openness
Openness of a political system denotes the propensity of a political system to allow for the
expression of political demands of the citizenry, to be responsive to these demands, and to offer
opportunities for citizen participation. Freedom of expressing political opinions is generally
regarded as a basic feature of each democratic polity, so only little variation is to be expected
among democratic countries in this respect. The existence of institutional channels of
participation however may vary according to the emphasis that constitutions give to political
representation or to more direct forms of participation like referenda. In this respect, one may
very well expect some variation between the countries covered in this study. When it comes to
the politicisating aspects of a polity, the historical experience with respect to political openness
may also be relevant: People who do not have much democratic experience probably also do
not have much propensity to participate and to be interested in politics. Responsiveness of a
polity to citizens’ demands, however, is an aspect of openness of the political system that is
difficult, if not impossible, to measure. A measurement of responsiveness would presuppose
knowledge of citizens’ demands in general and of the way government’s policies reflect these
demands. Both lack standard procedures of measurement.
Indicators of openness that are accessible for secondary analysis can be classified into three
groups: first there is a vast array of general indices of democracy, second there are indicators
that reflect more specific features of the opportunity structure of citizen political participation,
and third there are indicators that reflect the historical experience of a country with respect to
democracy and authoritarian leadership. We will deal with each of these sub-dimensions of
political system openness in the following subsections.
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C.1 Indicators for Democracy in General
Among the array of general indices of democracy, as reported e.g. in Schmidt (1997), we select
only those that cover all European countries that we intend to examine in our analysis (see
Table A.11).  The principle-components analysis does not support the hypothesis that the
indices establish a single dimension. The loadings of the indices of democracy on the first
principle component are not consistent with the view that a one-factor model of democracy can
be built upon them. Three of the indices of democracy show quite large positive loadings, one
shows a moderate positive loading, but the Coppedge/Reinicke Polyarchy Index and Gastil’s
Freedom House Index show negative loadings. In addition, the correlation matrix of these
indices has three eigenvalues greater than one. According to the Kaiser-Guttman criterion, this
suggests a three-dimensional solution. Promax rotation results in a pattern of loadings in which
two different indicators have high loadings on each rotated component. All three rotated
components are negatively correlated. If one would obtain a result like this from dimensional
analyses of these indicators of democracy based on all countries of the world, one could not
claim that all these indices would measure the same thing, that is, democracy. However, if there
is something common to all these measures of democracy, it should be reflected by the first
principle component. From its scores our general democracy indicator is constructed.
Table A.11: Indicators for Democracy in General
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label Loadings*
Bollen's liberal democracy index Schmidt (1997) BOLLEN .664
Coppedge/Reinicke polyarchy index 1985 Schmidt (1997) COPPEDGE -.271
Freedom house index for 1988 as reported by
Gastil (1990)
Schmidt (1997) GASTIL -.415
Jaggers/Gurr democracy index 1993 Schmidt (1997) JAGGGURR .340
Vanhanen's democracy index 1980-85 Schmidt (1997) VANHAN1 .893
Vanhanen's democracy index 1993 Schmidt (1997) VANHAN2 .773
Eigenvalue
No. 1
2.200
Percentage
of variance
36.6
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Democracy in general Factor scores on the basis of first principal component DEMOFAC
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
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C.2 Opportunity Structures for Participation
With respect to institutionally provided opportunities for political participation, two types can be
distinguished: opportunities for electoral participation and opportunities for direct participation by
referenda. With respect to the opportunities for electoral participation we distinguish between
the frequency of elections and the ways in which the electoral system transfers the electorate’s
choices into representative bodies. For the first aspect we employ the average number of
election per year. For the second aspect, we use both the effective number of parties and
Lijphart’s Index of Disproportionality as measures. Three indicators for opportunities for direct
participation via referenda are used: measures of the number and of the importance of
referenda, and the total number of referenda since 1945.
Table A.12: Indicators for Opportunity Structures for Participation
a) Original measures
Unr. sol. Rotated solution
Variable Source Label U1 R1 R2
Lijphart's index of
executive dominance
1971-96
Lijphart (1999) DISPRO71 .690 .342 -.703
Effective number of
parliamentary parties
1945-96
Lijphart (1999) EFNPAR71 -.272 .216 .892
Number of election per
year 1973-1998
Calculated after
Lijphart (1994)
NUMELECS -.247 -.120 .257
Number of referenda since
1945
Lane and Ersson
(1995)
LEREFNUM .842 .952 .071
Importance of referenda
since 1945
Lane and Ersson
(1995)
LEREFIMP .934 .938 -.125
Eigenvalue No. 1 2.195
Percentage of
variance
43.9 40.9 29.5
Correlation of
dimensions
1.000 -.166
-.166 1.000
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Opportunity structures Factor scores on the basis of first rotated component OPPOFAC1
Opportunity structures Factor scores on the basis of second rotated
component
OPPOFAC2
Notes: U1: Loadings on first principle component of unrotated solution. R1: Loadings on first principle
component of rotated solution. R2: Loadings on second principle component of rotated solution.
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Can these measures be combined into a valid summary indicator? A principle-components
analysis shows that this is not the case (see Table A.12). The loadings of the index of electoral
system disproportionality and the measures for referendum participation opportunities have both
large positive loadings on the first principle compent, while the loadings of the measure for the
frequency of election and of the effective number of parliamentary parties have small negative
loadings. Since the correlation matrix of the five measures has two eigenvalues larger than one,
a two-dimensional solution is suggested. The result of promax rotation of the first two principle
components indicates that referendum participation opportunities and electoral participation
opportunities constitute two separate, slightly negatively correlated dimensions. Therefore, we
construct two separate indicators for the opportunity structure for participation based on the
scores from both rotated components.
C.3 Historical Experience
Two aspects of historical experience of democracy are reflected by the indicators that we
consider here. The first aspect is the initial transition from the ancient regime to democratic
forms of government. The introduction of modernized leadership, and of male and of female
universal suffrage mark crucial steps in this process. The corresponding measures, along with
their sources, are shown in Table A.13. The other aspect is the duration of an authoritarian
interlude after the initial establishment of democratic institutions and the length of time since
their re-introduction. The duration of authoritarian experience reflects the length of the period in
which authoritarian political structures inhibited and discouraged political participation and
political interest. The date of the last re-introduction of universal suffrage expresses the length
of time in which the population could recover from authoritarian experience, possibly regaining
confidence in newly open opportunities for participation.
Do these features of historical development refer to a latent structure of democratic
experiences? Principle-components analysis reveals that the answer is negative (see again
Table A.13). Only two of the measures have high loadings on the first principle component. In
addition, the correlation matrix of the indicators has two eigenvalues larger than one. Thus a
two-dimensional model is clearly favoured by any criterion of component extraction. Promax
rotation does not seem to change the initial solution very much. The explained variances of the
rotated components are very close to the initial eigenvalues. Despite the fact that the method of
rotation allows for oblique components, the rotated components are almost uncorrelated.
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Table A.13: Indicators for the Historical Experience of Democracy
a) Original
measures
Unrotated
solution
Rotated
solution
Variable Source Label U1 R1 R2
Year of
introduction of
modernized
leadership
Lane and Ersson (1995) MODLEAD .243 .135 .757
Year of first
introduction of
male universal
suffrage
Mackie and Rose (1991); Lane,
McKay, and Newton (1997); Theen
and Wilson (1996); Merkel and
Stiehl (1997); Inter-Parliamentary
Union (1986); Petersson (1989);
FMSUFFRA .097 .001 .667
Year of first
introduction of
female universal
suffrage
Mackie and Rose (1991); Lane,
McKay, and Newton (1997); Theen
and Wilson (1996); Merkel and
Stiehl (1997); Inter-Parliamentary
Union (1986); Petersson (1989);
FFSUFFRA .050 .151 -.693
Length of
authoritarian
experience after
1900
Lane and Ersson (1995) AUTLEN .969 .950 .173
Year of last
introduction of
universal suffrage
Mackie and Rose (1991); Lane,
McKay, and Newton (1997); Theen
and Wilson (1996); Merkel and
Stiehl (1997); Inter-Parliamentary
Union (1986); Petersson (1989);
LSUFFRAG .915 .947 -.181
Eigenvalue
No. 1
1.848
Percentage
of variance
36.9 36.8 31.3
Correlation of
dimensions
1.000 .027
.027 1.000
b) Constructed
measures
Variable Source Label
History of
democracy
Factor scores on the basis of first principle component of rotated
solution
HIST1
History of
democracy
Factor scores on the basis of second principle component of rotated
solution
HIST2
Notes: U1: Loadings on first principle component of unrotated solution. R1: Loadings on first principle
component of rotated solution. R2: Loadings on second principle component of rotated solution.
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As the patterns of loadings on the first rotated components show the two measures that are
related to the experience of authoritarian leadership after 1900 are dominant. It is to be
suspected, therefore, that both measures of authoritarian experience are redundant, at least in
the set of countries covered in this study. The second factor shows an erratic patterns of
loadings: the date of introduction of male universal suffrage and the date of introduction of
female universal suffrage have loadings of opposite signs. For these reasons a second
principle-components analysis is conducted in which both the date of last (re)introduction of
universal suffrage and the date of the first introduction of female universal suffrage are excluded
from the analysis.
The principle-components analysis on the basis of only three indicators of historical experience
clearly supports a one-dimensional model. The loadings of all three indicators on the first
principle component are fairly high. The corresponding eigenvalue is the only one larger than
one and indicates that this principle component covers almost half of the variance of the three
indicators.
Three measures of historical experience are constructed on the base of the principle-
components analyses: Two measures based scores from the rotated first two components of
the complete set of five original measures and one measure based on scores on the first
principle component of the reduced set of three original measures.
C.4 Political System Openness as a Single Dimension?
Since we started with the idea that the factors indicated all belong to a general process of
democratisation in Western European countries, the various indicators developed might be
reduced even further if a latent structure can be detected. For this reason comprehensive
dimensional analyses are performed to explore the relationship between the indicators for
openness of the political system. Those variables that either lack data for some of the countries
covered in this paper or proved to be redundant are excluded from these analyses.
The principle-components analysis of the set fourteen indicators of political system openness
does not support a one-dimensional model. The correlation matrix of the indicators has six
eigenvalues larger than one. The Kaiser-Guttman criterion thus suggests a six-dimensional
model, while the scree criterion suggests a two-dimensional model. Since the purpose of this
exercise is data reduction in addition to the results obtained in the preceding subsections, the
two-dimensional solution is chosen. The promax-rotated two-dimensional solution, however,
does not lead to a stringent interpretation. First, the patterns of the loadings of the indices of
general democracy on both rotated components are quite heterogeneous (see Table A.14).
Second, the index of disproportionality of the electoral system and the measures of the
frequency and importance of referenda have large loadings with the same sign on the second
component. Nevertheless, the first rotated component does allow for the interpretation as
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expressing political openness, since all variables that have a large positive loading on this factor
are indicators of political openness, while the duration of authoritarian experience – which is an
indicator of the absence of political openness in the past – has a fairly large negative loading.
For these reasons, indices for the openness of the political system are constructed from the
factor scores of the two rotated component.
Table A.14: A Test of One-Dimensionality of Political System Openness
a) Original measures
Variable* Label U1
Bollen's liberal democracy index BOLLEN .463
Coppedge/Reinicke polyarchy index 1985 COPPEDGE -.337
Freedom house index for 1988 as reported by Gastil (1990) GASTIL -.352
Jaggers/Gurr democracy index 1993 JAGGGURR .577
Vanhanen's democracy index 1980-85 VANHAN1 .824
Vanhanen's democracy index 1993 VANHAN2 .676
Lijphart's index of executive dominance 1971-96 DISPRO71 -.593
Effective number of parliamentary parties
1945-96
EFNPAR71 .734
Number of election this year NUMELECS -.041
Number of referenda since 1945 LEREFNUM -.408
Importance of referenda since 1945 LEREFIMP -.571
Length of authoritarian experience after 1900 AUTLEN -.299
Year of first introduction of male universal suffrage FMSUFFRA .246
Year of introduction of modernized leadership MODLEAD -.339
Eigenvalue No. 1 3.574
Percentage of
variance
25.5
Notes: For sources of variable see preceding tables. U1: Loadings on first principle component of
unrotated solution. R1: Loadings on first principle component of rotated solution. R2: Loadings on
second principle component of rotated solution.
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D. Control Capacity of the State
Control capacity of government refers to the properties of a political system that determine the
attainment of political goals set by governments. We do not refer to the administrative skills and
political determinateness of politicians acting as members of government, but rather to the
structural properties of a political system that restrict or facilitate their political pursuits. An ideal
way to measure control capacity of a country’s government would consist of a comparison of
the declared goals of the respective governments with the actual outcomes of the policies that
are implemented to reach these goals. For the lack of appropriate measures of this, we have to
use a more indirect way to operationalise this concept. Control capacity of a government is
measured by those properties of the political system that are more easily to observe and that
are plausible factors affecting the control capacity. The cases considered here are the
centralisation/decentralisation of governmental structures, the institutional constraints to
(central) government, and the stability and effectiveness of national governments.
Table A.15: Indicators for Centralisation
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label U1
Central government's share of direct
taxes and contributions
Computed after OECD:
National Accounts II
(OECD 1999)
DTXCENTR .791
Central government's share of
government final consumption
expenditure
Calculated after OECD:
National Accounts II
(OECD 1999)
EXPCENTR .670
Central government's share of
government current receipts
Calculated after OECD:
National Accounts II
(OECD 1999)
RCPCENTR .906
Unitary vs. federal constitution Lijphart (1984) FEDER71 -.817
Lijphart's index of bicameralism 1971-96 Lijphart (1999) BICAM71 -.467
Eigenvalue
No. 1
2.784
Percentage
of variance
55.7
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Centralism/Federalism Factor scores on the basis of first
principle component
CENTFAC
Notes: U1: Loadings on first principle component of unrotated solution. R1: Loadings on first principle
component of rotated solution. R2: Loadings on second principle component of rotated solution.
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D.1 Centralism/Decentralism and Federalism
Centralisation/decentralisation of governmental structures has mainly two aspects: a fiscal one
and a more institutional/constitutional one. The fiscal aspect of centralisation is the extend to
which both the extraction and consumption of financial resources are either centralized in the
hands of central government or dispersed over different levels of national, regional, or local
governments or administrative bodies. This aspect is measured here by the central
governments’ share of general government current receipts, by the central governments’ share
of  general government final expenditure, and by the central governments’ share of direct taxes
and contributions (see Table A.15). The institutional/constitutional aspect of
centralisation/decentralisation manifests itself in a federal or unitary constitution and in a
unicameral or bicameral structure of the legislature. The former is measured by Lijphart’s (1999)
index of federalism for the period of 1971 to 1996, the latter is measured by Lijphart’s (1999)
index of bicameralism for the period of 1971 to 1996.
As in preceding sections, principle-components analysis is used to assess the possibility of a
single indicator of centralism/decentralism. Although the Kaiser-Guttman criterion suggests a
two-dimensional solution, a one-dimensional solution is preferred here. The first eigenvalue is
much larger than the second, corresponding to over 55 per cent explained variance. The
loadings on the first principle component are all relatively large, except for the bicameralism
indicator. The pattern of the loadings on the promax-rotated first two principle components,
however, is not easy to interpret. Therefore, the indicator of centralism/decentralism is based on
the scores on the first principle component.
D.2 Institutional Constraints
A second dimension of control capacity of government is the extent to which government faces
institutional constraints to its authority and action. Obviously, decentralisation and federalism
may very well be regarded as a type of institutional constraint. Therefore, in this context
institutional constraints form a residual category beside federalism or decentralisation, which
comprises bicameralism, constitutional rigidity, judicial review, and central bank independence.
In addition to indicators of these features of the polity, taken from Lijphart (1999), we also use
Schmidt’s (1996) indices of institutional constraints, institutional pluralism and institutional
structure.
For a summary indicator of institutional constraints, the indicators just mentioned should
constitute a single dimension. Principle-components analysis shows that this is indeed the case.
By any common extraction criterion a one-dimensional solution is supported. All factor loadings
are larger than 0.5; most of them being larger than 0.7. Consequently, our summary indicator of
institutional constraints is constructed on the basis of factor scores on the first and only principle
component (see Table A.16).
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D.3 Stable and Effective Governments
The presence of structures that foster stable and effective government is an essential
precondition of control capacity of states and these structures form another dimension of control
capacity. As indicators of the stability and effectiveness of government activities the following
indicators are considered: cabinet durability (around 1975, 1980, and 1985); Lane and Ersson’s
party government index, and Lijphart’s indices of minimal winning coalitions and of executive
dominance (see Table 17).
Table A.16: Indicators for Institutional Constraints of Government Activity
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label Loadings*
Lijphart's index of
bicameralism 1971-96
Lijphart (1999) BICAM71 .816
Lijphart's index of
constitutional rigidity 1971-
96
Lijphart (1999) CONRIG71 .516
Lijphart's index of judicial
review 1971-96
Lijphart (1999) JUDREV71 .769
Lijphart's index of central
bank independence 1971-96
Lijphart (1999) CENBA71 .610
Insitutional constraints of
central state
Schmidt (1996), after Armigeon,
Beyeler et al. (1999)
INSTCONS .870
Index of institutional
pluralism
Schmidt (1996), after Armigeon,
Beyeler et al. (1999)
PLURAL .727
Index of constitutional
structures
Schmidt (1996), after Armigeon,
Beyeler et al. (1999)
STRUCTUR .728
Eigenvalue No. 1 3.716
Percentage of
variance
53.0
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Institutional constraints Factor scores on the basis of first principle
component
INSTFACT
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
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As in the case of the indicators of centralisation/decentralisation, principle-components analysis
is conducted in order to explore the underlying structure. The results of this analysis, however,
is ambiguous. On the one hand, the principle of parsimony and the Scree criterion of
component extraction support a one-dimensional model. On the other hand, the Kaiser-Guttman
criterion and the substantial interpretability of the rotated two-dimensional solution suggest a
two-dimensional solution. For these reasons, for further analyses factor scores are generated
both from the first principle component and from the two rotated components.
Table A.17: Indicators for Government Stability and Effectiveness
a) Original measures
Unr. sol. Rotated solution
Variable Source Label U1 R1 R2
Average cabinet durability
1975-79
Lane and Ersson
(1995)
CABDUR75 .694 .362 .512
Average cabinet durability
1980-84
Lane and Ersson
(1995)
CABDUR80 .786 .185 .855
Average cabinet durability
1985-89
Lane and Ersson
(1995)
CABDUR85 .529 -.204 .979
Party government index Lane and Ersson
(1995)
PARTGOV .829 .870 .073
Percentage of minimal
winning or one-party cabinets
1971-96
Lijphart (1999) MINWI71 .777 .896 -.029
Lijphart's index of executive
dominance 1971-96
Lijphart (1999) EXDOM71 .752 .872 -.034
Eigenvalue
No. 1
3.241
Percentage
of variance
54.0 47.5 39.1
Correlation of
dimensions
1.000 .335
.335 1.000
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Government effectiveness Factor scores on the basis of first rotated component GOVFACT1
Government stability Factor scores on the basis of second rotated
component
GOVFACT2
Notes: U1: Loadings on first principle component of unrotated solution. R1: Loadings on first principle
component of rotated solution. R2: Loadings on second principle component of rotated solution.
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D.4 Structures of Interest Mediation
Consociationalism and corporatism offer opportunities of mediation between potentially
conflicting interests; between opposing political camps in case of consociationalism, and
between government and powerful interest groups in case of corporatism. The consequences of
the presence of opportunities for interest accommodation for control capacity, however, may be
ambivalent. Interest accommodation may result in a pre-selection of government’s policy
options. Governments will drop policies that – after bargaining with opposition parties or with
relevant interest groups – turn out to be infeasible. But this pre-selection will result in the
adoption of only those policies that are feasible, thus enhancing rather than limiting the control
capacity of government.
Three indicators of structures of interest mediation are available here: Lane and Ersson’s (1995)
indices of consociationalism and of corporatism, and Lijphart’s (1999) index of interest group
pluralism/corporatism (see Table A.18). These indicators clearly constitute a common
dimension as a principle-components analysis shows. Therefore, we construct a summary
indicator of interest mediation based on the scores on the first principle component.
Table A.18: Indicators for Structures of Interest Mediation
a) Original measures
Variable Source Label Loadings*
Consociationism index Lane and Ersson (1995) CONSOCIA .543
Corporatism index Lane and Ersson (1995) CORPORAT .891
Lijphart's index of interest group
pluralism 1971-96
Lijphart (1999) GRUPLU71 -.961
Eigenvalue No. 1 2.014
Percentage of
variance
67.1
b) Constructed measures
Variable Source Label
Structures of interest mediation Factor scores on the base of first principle
component
MEDIFACT
Note: * Loadings on the first unrotated principle component.
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D.5 Control Capacity as a Single Dimension?
In the foregoing sub-sections we considered four different sub-concepts of control capacity.
After dealing with each of these sub-concepts one may very well ask whether these sub-
concepts can be seen as indicators of a common latent structure for the more general concept
of control capacity. An answer to this question can be obtained on the basis of a principle-
components analysis of all of the indicators of control capacity so far examined.
As Table A.19 shows, not all of the loadings of the indicators of control capacity on the first
principle component, which explaines just 30 percent of the total variance of the indicators,
show signs that are consistent with the concept of control capacity. Based on the loadings of the
Table A.19: A Test of One-Dimensionality of Control Capacity of the State
a) Original measures
Variable* Label Loadings**
Central government's share of direct taxes and contributions DTXCENTR -.514
Central government's share of government final consumption
expenditure
EXPCENTR -.610
Central Government's share of government current receipts RCPCENTR -.684
Lijphart's index of federalism 1971-96 FEDER71 .937
Lijphart's index of bicameralism 1971-96 BICAM71 .588
Lijphart's index of constitutional rigidity 1971-96 CONRIG71 .559
Lijphart's index of judicial review 1971-96 JUDREV71 .575
Lijphart's index of central bank independence 1971-96 CENBA71 .766
Insitutional constraints of central state INSTCONS .592
Index of institutional pluralism PLURAL .493
Index of constitutional structures STRUCTUR .724
Average cabinet durability 1975-79 CABDUR75 .561
Average cabinet durability 1980-84 CABDUR80 .426
Average cabinet durability 1985-89 CABDUR85 .403
Party government index PARTGOV .155
Percentage of minimal winning or one-party cabinets 1971-96 MINWI71 .019
Lijphart's index of executive dominance 1971-96 EXDOM71 .556
Consociationism index CONSOCIA .393
Corporatism index CORPORAT .191
Lijphart's index of interest group pluralism
1971-96
GRUPLU71 -.396
Eigenvalue
No. 1
6.022
Percentage of
variance
30.1
Note: * For sources of variables see preceding tables.** Loadings on the first unrotated principle
component.
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indicators for centralisation/decentralisation and for institutional constraints, it is clear that high
values on this component indicate low levels of control capacity. However, the indicators of
cabinet stability have positive loadings on this component, which contradicts this interpretation.
Furthermore, the loadings of the other indicators of stability and effectiveness of national
governments are small or have a sign also contradicting this interpretation. The same applies to
the indicators of interest mediation. Nevertheless, a principle-components analysis in which all
indicators are dropped that have loadings in the ‘wrong’ direction leads to a result that is more
consistent with a one-dimensional model of control capacity. Therefore, a summary indicator of
control capacity is constructed on the base of factor scores on the first and only principle
component that results from this analysis.
E. Modernisation
Socio-economic development is usually seen as a prerequisite for democracy (see e.g. Lipset
2000). Extending this line of reasoning one may assume that levels of political interest are less
related to specific features of the political system than to the general process of socio-economic
modernisation. In order to be able to test this assumption, we construct an indicator of
modernisation. GDP per capita at constant prices and exchange rates to the US Dollar, and
GDP per capita at constant prices and purchase power parities to the US Dollar are used as
measures of economic productivity as an aspect of economic modernisation. The sectoral
composition of the workforce is also used as an indicator of modernisation. Since the relative
sizes of the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors sum to unity, one of these indicators is
dropped from our analysis, the relative size of the industrial sector. As in the previous sections,
we employ principle-components analysis to test whether these indicators form a common
dimension.
The result of the principle-components analysis, which are shown in Table A.20, clearly support
a one-dimensional view on modernisation. All four variables have loadings larger than 0.9 on
the first principle component, which explains more than 80 per cent of the variance. However,
there is no data on sectoral composition of the workforce for Norway and Austria. In order to
obtain an indicator for modernisation, the principle-components analysis is repeated on the
basis of the GDP measures only. A summary indicator of modernisation is constructed then
from the scores on the first principle component of this analysis.
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Table A.20: Indicators for Socio-Economic Modernisation
a) Original measures Principle-components
analyses
I II
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